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Introduction: from Truth to Identity to Security 
―Try to remain truthful. The power of truth never declines. Force and violence may be effective in the 
short term, but in the long run it‘s truth that prevails. Being honest and truthful engenders trust and 
trust leads to friendship and a good reputation. Because we all need friends, honesty and transparency 
are a basic aspect of human nature.‖ 
Dalai Lama, 26/02/2014 on Facebook 
Convert to my new faith crowd 
I offer you what no one has had before 
I offer you inclemency and wine 
The one who won‘t have bread will be fed by the light of my sun 
People nothing is forbidden in my faith 
There is loving and drinking 
And looking at the Sun for as long as you want 
And this godhead forbids you nothing 
Oh obey my call brethren people crowd 
 
Radovan Karadcic
1
 
 
The spirit of the former quote seems advisable and may even practically avoid the fatal 
catharsis of the latter. But does it have any resemblance in international (human rights) law? 
Is it possible to stop a satanic leader in his manipulation of people before it is too late without 
undemocratically restricting the freedom of expression?   
We are witnessing a situation today where a part of an independent country is being annexed 
not in a ‗classical‘ way, .i.e. foremost with tanks and soldiers and military force but mainly 
via propaganda, by invoking national tensions until violent protests, by falsifying facts and 
manipulating history.
2
 Ukraine and Georgia are two recent examples of neo-imperialist spirit 
dominating Russia‘s national ideology and foreign political line of actions. As Edward Lucas 
argues, ―He [Putin, M.R.] is prepared to make his people suffer economic pain and risk war 
for what he believes is their national interest.‖3 [emphasis added, M.R.] 
The national interest of any country, besides the social welfare and security of the people, is 
formulated and influenced by the leaders, by policies and legislature, reflecting the political 
                                                 
1
  Radovan Karadcic was a psychiatrist, not just a tough political leader and war-manager, and, as Slavoj Žižek 
claims, his poetry ―should not be dismissed as ridiculous: it deserves a close reading, since it tells us something 
about the way ethnic cleansing works.‖ Žižek, S., "The military poetic complex", London Review of Books. Vol. 
30 (16), 2008 (English), available at: http://www.egs.edu/faculty/slavoj-zizek/articles/the-military-poetic-
complex/ [accessed 18/04/2014] 
2
 See e.g. Applebaum, A., ―A fearful new world, imperiled by Russia‘s subterfuge‖, Washington Post, 
17/04/2014, available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/anne-applebaum-a-fearful-new-world-
imperiled-by-russias-subterfuge/2014/04/16/69a28170-c584-11e3-9f37-7ce307c56815_story.html [accessed 
18/04/2014] 
3
  Lucas, E., ―I hope I'm wrong but historians may look back and say this was the start of World War III‖, Daily 
Mail, 16/04/2014, available at: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2605578/Edward-Lucas-I-hope-Im-
wrong-historians-look-say-start-World-War-III.html#ixzz2zEMOsB4i [accessed 18/04/2014] 
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settlement of a time. The process of such formulation is largely directed on influencing 
people‘s attitudes and beliefs, people‘s identity as the basis for a collective national identity 
legitimising the national interest and state‘s actions abroad.4 Russian state-controlled media 
has been pretty successful in presenting Ukrainian and Georgian events as being in absolutely 
legitimate national interests of Russia, which the hypocritical West simply does not 
understand or does not want to understand. But this success rests on a longer, wider and 
deeper process of national identity building, the historical consciousness and collective public 
memory of Russian people, World War II or Great Patriotic War (as it is called in Russia) and 
Russia‘s role as a member of anti-Hitler coalition together with Orthodox heritance forms a 
central part of it.
5
  
History, the narrative created of it, forms an enormous part of both individual and collective 
identity of any country: ―History makes a nation,‖ has been explicitly claimed by some 
authors
6
 and its importance in the present confirmed by others.
7
 It is a normal part of cultural 
development of any nation to build and sustain the identity of the country, provide basis for 
patriotism, feeling of belonging. Thus, in the context of constant informational confrontation 
it has, maybe more than ever, become a question of security. As argued by former Estonian 
minister of defence, Jaak Aaviksoo, acknowledging and practicing the right to informational 
self-determination by states is necessary for psychological self-defence because instead of 
conventional attacks the informational ones are much more evident today, the informational 
                                                 
4
 See e.g. Rosenau, James  N. ―Governance, Order, and Change in World Politics‖ in Rosenau, J. N and 
Czempiel, Ernst-Otto ―Governance without Government: order and Change in World Politics‖, Cambridge 2005, 
pp 1-29, pp 14-15: ―The numerous patterns that sustain global order can be conceived as unfolding at three basic 
levels of activity: (1) at the ideational or inter-subjective level of what people dimly sense, incisively perceive, or 
otherwise understand are the arrangements through which their affairs are handled; (2) at the behavioural or 
objective level of what people regularly and routinely do, often unknowingly, to maintain the prevailing global 
arrangements; and (3) at the aggregate or political level where governance occurs and rule-oriented institutions 
and regimes enact and implement the policies inherent in the ideational and behavioural patterns. […] It should 
be stressed that, whatever may be the degree of orderliness that marks global affairs at any period in history, it is 
a product of activity at all three of these levels.‖   
5
 See e.g. Von Gall, C., ―Gesetzliche Zementierung eines geschichtlichen Weltbildes in Russland - Die 
Gesetzentwürfe über die Haftung für die Verfälschung der Geschichte‖, in Von Gall, C., Nußberger, A., 
―Bewusstes Erinnern und bewusstes vergessen‖, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, 2011, pp 287-315 
6
 Appleby, J., Hunt, L., Jacob, M., ―Telling the Truth about History‖, WW Norton & Company, New York-
London, 1995, p 91 
7
 See e.g. Möller, H., „Mälestused, ajalugu, identiteet‖ (―Memories, History, Identity‖), Eesti Päevaleht, 
01/08/2006, available at: http://epl.delfi.ee/news/kultuur/malestused-ajalugu-identiteet.d?id=51045924 [accessed 
18/04/2014] (original article in Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, Vol. 28, 2001, translation into Estonian by Külli-
Riin Tigasson); Halbwachs, M. ―On Collective Memory‖, University of Chicago Press, Chichago-London, 1992, 
reference in Kaarlõp-Nani, H., „Mälukonfliktide ületamise võimalusi ajalooõpetuse kaudu― (―Possibilities to 
Overcome the Conflicts of Memory through the Teaching of History‖), Master thesis, Tallinn University, 
Institute of History, supervisor Mare Oja, MA, Tallinn, 2013, p 6 (footnote 12), p 8 (footnote 20) 
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opposition always exists and ―the ‗sword of truth‘ is not enough for self-defence.‖8 In this line 
he states: 
―We are slowly accepting the idea that people have the right to information self-determination. This 
right could, and should, be extended to all self-aware entities, which may include many people – for 
example, families, communities, villages, clubs and definitely nation states. A nation state‟s right to 
information self-determination means, inter alia, that it has the right to secrets and lies.‖9 [emphasis 
added, M.R] 
I do agree that states have the right to informational-emotional self-determination in a sense 
described here but disagree that it entails the right to secrets and lies. In fact, I think namely 
the prohibition of deliberate lies (manipulation of facts) and limits on legitimately declaring 
certain information a state secret, constrain the self-determination in question.  
It should be admitted that the strength and security of a state lays first and foremost in people, 
the people who affiliate themselves with a state through their (collective) national identity. It 
might be said that wounds in this part of security are the most substantial ones – there is no 
self-defence without people and in the end no justification for the existence of sovereign 
power not representing the people. The latter is basically what Russia claims to be the 
justification for her intervention in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine – ‗Bandera‘ government 
(‗junta‘) and ‗fascist guerillas‘ are not representing or protecting Ukrainians, the brethren 
Slavic nation who needs the protection from Russia, demonstrating their respective will on 
‗referendum‘ and on the streets.10  
Another important argument, strongly connected to and shaping the former, is historical – 
Crimea is historically part of Russia and taking it back is a matter of fixing historical 
injustice.
11
 If we admit that the state has an unlimited right to ‗secrets and lies‘, we should 
tolerate the propaganda-war waged by Russia as a legitimate means for protecting its national 
identity, exercising ‗informational-emotional self-determination‘. We would admit that 
international law, including international human rights law, is impotent to act proactively, 
before people have already suffered. Thus, dealing with the consequences does not change the 
                                                 
8
  Aaviksoo, J ―Information Confrontation and Self-defence‖ Diplomaatia, March 2011. 
http://www.diplomaatia.ee/en/article/information-confrontation-and-self-defence/ [accessed 15/03/2014] 
9
  Ibid 
10
 See speech of Vladimir V. Putin on Crimean annexation that was interrupted with applaus at least 30 times, 
available at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=REX_9TK0H08, with English translation:  
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PDLwu4E35us [accessed 18/04/2014] 
11
  Ibid 
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―internal legitimation‖12 created inside a country for such actions, it does not stop the leaders 
from strengthening and sustaining it, and eventually from keeping repeating the same 
behaviour.  
This master thesis is about the part of the identity creation or nation building
13
 – historical 
narrative. In the described framework it explores, how far can the state go in exercising its 
right to informational-emotional self-determination (or collective national identity building) 
without infringing individuals‘ rights and its global duties as a member of international 
community? How far can the politicising of the history go, where could be the ‗red line‘? 
The focus of this research lays on the crimes against humanity of 20
th
 century. It has been 
argued that commemorative practices are not based on ―heroic myth of national sacrifice and 
greatness‖ anymore but rather on acknowledgment of ―the forgotten, the mistreated, the 
enslaved, and the murdered.‖14 The historical knowledge substituting personal memories, but 
also the omission of it, ―is always reconstructive or warning,‖ the aura of museums, 
exhibitions, memorials etc. ―can and must be used as a warning but it cannot be done without 
the information.‖15 Genocides and other crimes against humanity that happened in 1990‘s 
(like Srebrenica and Rwanda), the on-going debate on earlier atrocities, including the project 
of seeking for a ‗common European identity‘ and the actions of Russia that rest on the support 
of many Russian citizens based on their national identity, sadly-vividly illustrate the 
importance of the need for such historical knowledge.  
Does this need have a reflection in international law? The research question of this thesis is: Is 
there a right to truth about the crimes against humanity in international (human rights) law 
as could be subsumed from the developments and understandings of history and the task of 
                                                 
12
 See Grant, R. W and Keohane, R. O ―Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics―, American 
Political Science Review, Vol 99, 2005, pp 29-43, p 35: ―If the powerful acting state controls substantial material 
resources, including force, and if it has strong internal legitimacy – so that its public does not react negatively if 
its leaders are criticized abroad – it may be largely immune from sanctions, as the United States was in 2003.‖ 
13
  Here understood narrowly, ―as a process which leads to the formation of countries in which the citizens feel a 
sufficient amount of commonality of interests, goals and preferences so that they do not wish to separate from 
each other,‖ conducted mainly by means such as education, media and cultural policies and administrative 
measures (e.g. language and minority policies). See e.g. Alesina, A. and Reich, B., ―Nation Building‖, latest 
Revision: August 2013, available at: http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/workshops/econ-
policy/PDF/Nation%20Building.pdf [accessed 20/04/2014] About the importance of nation building in a wider 
sense to national and international peace and security see e.g. Stephenson, C., ―Nation Building‖, Beyond 
Intractability Resources, January 2005, available at: http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/nation-building 
[accessed 20/04/2014] The terms ‗nation building‘ and ‗national identity creation‘ will be used as synonyms if 
not otherwise expressed.  
14
 Torpey, J., ―Introduction: Politics and the Past‖, in Torpey, J. (ed.), ―Politics and the Past: On Repairing 
Historical Injustices‖, Rowman & Littlefield, Oxford, 2003, pp 1-26, p 24 
15
  Möller, H., 2006 
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historians after the World War II, guided by the ―duty to remember‖?16 In that way this thesis 
also answers the question of what does the ‗duty to remember‘ actually mean, as posed 
(although not in strictly legal context) by Hent Kalmo: ―[W]hat could a command 
‗Remember!‖ mean?‖ and how does that interact with the need to forget in order to overcome 
the pain of the past injustices?
17
 My hypothesis is that states are not completely free to create 
any historical narrative concerning past atrocities, irrespective of historical facts.  
The questions addressed in this thesis – What is the minimal level of truth that shall be 
provided about past tragedies? Who can claim that? How to understand the notion of 
historical truth in the context of many different interpretations of historical events? – are not 
expressis verbis dealt with in any of the so-called hard law document of international law, 
neither is the concept of the right to truth (beyond transitional period). This research aims at 
touching upon limits of human rights law, strongly deriving from the idea of law being an art 
of goodness and justice, the perspective of natural law, using contextualisation and systematic 
approach, incorporating perspectives of philosophy, history and social-political studies.  
I will focus on two dark historical inheritances of Europe – Holocaust and Communist crimes 
– that form the debate of ‗common European memory‘ and are the centre of national identity 
creation in Russia. This is of a particular importance also from the perspective of Estonian 
national security, identity, integration and citizenship policies because of the proven fact
18
 
that the loyalty and integration of the Russian-speaking minority is very much related to the 
different interpretation of the history of the World War II – this is one of the most crucial 
factors separating the Estonian society into Estonian and Russian communities. The riots 
around the replacement of the statute of the Bronze Soldier in 2007 and events taking place in 
Ukraine provide vivid examples, how historical consciousness may become a question of 
security not only for one country but for the Europe or even the whole world. Because of 
those reasons, Russian memory politics and law is taken as a case study for this research.   
                                                 
16
  ――Duty to remember‖ is translated from the French expression ―Devoir de memoire‖.  It normally means the 
duty, the advice or the obligation, for the sake of human conscience, not to forget Nazism‘s horrendous genocide 
which killed 6 million Jews in the Second World War.‖ Vietnamese and American Veterans website, 
http://www.vietamericanvets.com/Page-PointofView-DutyToRemember.htm [accessed 19/04/2014] 
17
  Kalmo, H., „Kohustus mäletada, kohustus unustada― (―Duty to Remember, Duty to Forget‖), Vikerkaar, No. 
10-11, 2009, pp 109-121, p 110 [my translation from Estonian] 
18
  See e.g. Kirss, L. „Eraldatud haridus – eraldatud kodanikud?― (―Separated Education – Separated Citizens?‖), 
Praxis, 2010, available at: 
http://www.praxis.ee/fileadmin/tarmo/Projektid/Haridus/Euroopa_haridusprogrammide_mojude_hindamine/DE
DC/Toimetised_1_2010.pdf [accessed 15/03/2013]; Roos, R. „Eesti ja vene koolide noorte erinevad arusaamad 
ajaloost Teise maailmasõja näitel‖ (―Different Understandings of History of the Students of Estonian and 
Russian Schools on the Example of the History of the Second World War‖), Haridus, Vol. 2, 2010, lk 19–21  
8 
 
International human rights law as the strongest discipline restricting state sovereignty on the 
ground of the rights of individuals, thereby also very much touching upon the identities of 
people and collectives, is a suitable framework for dealing with the stated questions. The 
biggest and most disputed paradox of human rights is their principal universal nature vs. 
culture-determined particularity in implementation: The Vienna Declaration of 1993 states 
that the universal nature of human rights (being ―the birthright of all human beings‖) ―is 
beyond question‖ but at the same time that ―the significance of national and regional 
particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds must be borne in 
mind.‖19  
In a very interesting master thesis
20
 about the local or cultural contestation of human rights in 
Russia it is claimed that legal approach is not enough to explain the variety of ways human 
rights are perceived among different countries and parts of the world. I agree that to 
understand and efficiently implement human rights it is necessary to go beyond legal sphere. 
However, I want to ask and critically evaluate if the vocabulary and concept of human rights 
has been fully used or maybe there are some underemployed possibilities. I do not believe that 
politics can be regulated from inside politics as suggested in the referred thesis – that makes a 
vicious circle, where implementation of human rights depends solely on the political will and 
power-struggles. Successful cultural contestation of human rights presumes political will but 
cannot depend solely on that, it still needs enforcement and certainty from law as a substance 
controlling and limiting political arbitrariness. In the following framework: 
 
                                                 
19
 World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, 25 June 1993, 
A/CONF.157/23 art I (1) and (5). http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/vienna.aspx [accessed 
14/02/2014] (hereinafter Vienna Declaration) 
20
 Preclik, P., ―Culture Re-introduced: Contestation of Human Rights in Contemporary Russia‖, E.MA 
Programme master thesis, supervised by Dr. iur Lauri Mälksoo, 2007/2008 in Tartu, an article published in 
Mälksoo, L. and Simons, W., B. (eds.), ―Russia and European Human Rights Law: Progress, Tensions and 
Perspectives‖, Review of Central and East European Law Special Issue, Vol. 37 (2-3), Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, Leiden-Boston, 2012, pp 173-230. 
• International 
human rights 
norms 
• State 
sovereignty 
and politics 
•Global 
security 
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I try to answer the stated question from the perspective of history as a major part of identity 
formation by interpreting it in the context of human rights law.  
Sources, Limitations, Methodology and Structure 
The main sources for the research are international (human rights) treaties, the so-called soft-
law, relevant jurisdiction of international courts and legal literature but also academic 
literature in the fields of history, legal philosophy, political and social studies. The main 
perspective and research question consider human rights, studying of other sources is needed 
to provide a comprehensive answer to the questions posed. It is not in the scope of this thesis 
to give a detailed answer to socio-psychological questions about identity creation or approach 
the theories of self-determination or global governance – these are the surrounding and 
connected areas around the central question about the right to (historical) truth in the 
discipline of human rights. Necessary abbreviations and simplifications for limiting the focus 
of the study may therefore be made concerning the surrounding fields.  
The thesis is not aimed at establishing a common historical truth. It is not possible, nor 
advisable. It is clear that there is no one and only narrative historical truth for the whole world 
but always several stories subject to individual interpretations, deriving from different 
perspectives. From the international-legal point of view the question is about the core 
minimum as can be interpreted from the existing legal approaches to the right to truth in the 
context of transitional justice and to the historical truth in peace-time, involving freedom of 
expression and information. For determining this core minimum content of the right, the 
philosophical approaches to the notion of truth will be examined.  
Besides introduction and conclusion the thesis is divided into three parts: the first chapter 
takes an insight into the content and development of the right to truth as an independent 
notion, discussing its applicability as a customary norm or general principle of human rights 
law, and the notion of truth in (international) legal sphere; the second chapter discusses the 
notion of historical truth, the application of the right to truth beyond transitional period, 
having a look at the interconnected process of identity formation, interaction of history and 
law, the application of historical truth in legal sphere and vice versa, depicting concrete 
examples of such interaction – the memory laws, and the project of the ‗common European 
memory‘ from its legal side; the third chapter takes Russian identity building under closer 
observation, providing thereby a concrete exemplary case for analysing whether a country 
complies with the right to truth in its national identity formation process.  
10 
 
The three parts form a whole through the research question of this thesis. To understand the 
origins and legal essence of the right to truth, transitional justice literature and legal acts, 
where the concept finds explicit mentioning and examination, needs to be studied. To 
establish the existence and nature of the right to truth in international human rights law as a 
substance restricting political manipulation of historical truth, it is necessary to deal with 
‗duty to remember‘ in its today‘s connotations and expressions – memory laws and historical 
narrative creation in the light of freedom of expression and the right to information. For 
providing content and limits of the right to truth, the notion of truth is shortly examined also 
from philosophical perspective. As for the practical side, concrete example of nation building 
in modern Russia will be elaborated. 
1. The Right to Truth  
 ―Then you will know the truth, and the truth will set you free‖ 
John 8:32 
The right to truth has not been explicitly established in international treaty law. But, as will be 
depicted below, it finds mentioning in quite many legal documents characterized as ‗soft law‘ 
and court decisions of various international and national courts, it is essentially related to the 
scope and application of many jus cogens norms and it derives from the generally accepted 
values and virtues like humanity and justice. In order to place the notion of the right to truth 
in the system of international (human rights) law and try to clarify the legal content and 
contours of that right, some general comments on sources of international law shall be made.  
The only international legal instrument establishing a list of the sources of international law is 
the Statute of ICJ. Article 38 (1) of the Statute enlists the sources of international law as 
following:  
a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly 
recognized by the contesting states;  
b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;  
c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;  
d) […] judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the 
various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.
21
  
                                                 
21
 United Nations, Statute of the International Court of Justice, 18 April 1946, art 38 (1), available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3deb4b9c0.html [accessed 20 March 2014] 
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For further purposes of this research two questions should be discussed: first, the hierarchy 
between these sources; and second, as the right to truth finds mentioning in many non-binding 
documents, the status and role of the so-called soft law in the system of international law. 
Contrary to the national law that is traditionally a vertical system where fundamental values 
of society possess a constitutional status and lower legal and administrative acts must comply 
with the higher ones, international law has traditionally been considered ―a horizontal system 
of legal norms.‖22 Based on the Statute of ICJ and the principle of equal sovereignty of states, 
it has been argued that ―there is no hierarchy and […] logically there can be none: 
international rules are equivalent, sources are equivalent, and procedures are equivalent, all 
deriving from the will of states.‖23  
It is quite obvious that a total lack of hierarchy would eventually lead to anarchy.
24
 Very 
widely, this assumption could be regarded as the basis and reason for the more universality-
based developments
25
 in international law, the most eminent example of which is the 
emergence of jus cogens norms, that generally possess an erga omnes character.
26
 Article 53 
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties sets a strong constraint on the freedom of 
contract and the will of states in making international law, declaring that ―a treaty is void if, at 
the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law.‖27 
According to the same article ―a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm 
accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from 
                                                 
22
  De Wet, E. and Vidmar, J. (eds.), ―Hierarchy in International Law: The Place of Human Rights‖, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2012, p 1, referring to Dupuy, P.-M., ―Droit International Public‖ (9th edn Dalloz, 
Paris 2008) 14–16 (footnote 5) 
23
  Shelton, D., ―Normative Hierarchy in International Law‖, The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 
100 (2), 2006, pp. 291-323, p 291, referring to Dupuy, P.-M., ―Droit International Public‖ (9th edn Dalloz, Paris 
2008) 14–16 (footnote 3) 
24
  ―The opposite of hierarchy is anarchy, the complete absence of (any) hierarchy …‖ Koskinniemi, M., 
―Hierarchy in International Law: A Sketch‖, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 8, 1997, pp 566-582, p 
571. See also Nieto-Navia, R., ―International Peremptory Norms and International Humanitarian Law‖, Hague, 
2001, p 4, available at: http://www.iccnow.org/documents/WritingColombiaEng.pdf [accessed 22/03/14] In fact, 
Bodin, traditionally considered an advocate of absolute state sovereignty, also recognized that the sovereign was 
always subject to the overriding ‗laws of God,‘ natural law and the law of nations.‖  
25
  Appearing in a very early period of international law and represented already by the ‗father of international 
law‘, one of the most famous natural law scholars, Hugo Grotius. ―Grotius stated that principles of natural law 
were so immutable that not even God could change them.‖ See Nieto-Navia, R., 2001, p 3, referring to H. 
Grotius, “De Jure Belli Ac Pacis Libri Tres” (1625), 1, Ch. 1, X, 5., footnote 3 
26
  On distiction of jus cogens and erga omnes norms see e.g. Nieto-Navia, R., 2001, p 14. Referring to Ian 
Brownlie the author explains that erga omnes norms are ―[o]pposable to, valid against, ‗all the world‘, i.e. all 
other legal persons, irrespective of consent on the part of those thus affected.‖ He also notes that ―although all 
norms of jus cogens are enforceable erga omnes not all erga omnes obligations are jus cogens.‖ 
27
  United Nations, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 
1155, p. 331, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3a10.html [accessed 21 March 2014] 
12 
 
which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of 
general international law having the same character.‖28 
It is important to note that, although deriving from the same idea of a ‗common good of 
humanity‘ and jus naturale necessarium as concepts above positive law, jus cogens norms, 
differently from natural law, ―form an integral part of ‗positive‘ law itself and are defined and 
recognized by international law.‖29 
For establishing a framework for further analysis in the context of purposes and limits of this 
thesis, I will conclude with a few standpoints that summarise the discussions and locate 
human rights in the system of international law.  
First, current international system cannot operate on the basis of states‘ consent only. There is 
clearly a need to guarantee the effectiveness of international law and protect it from sabotage 
by ―recalcitrant states […] seeking to denounce, or acting to violate multilateral agreements 
that reflect widely and deeply held values, such as those guaranteeing human rights or 
expressing humanitarian law‖ and may thereby ―pose risks to all humanity.‖30 As the consent-
based international legal system lacks mechanisms to ―override the will‖ of such states, I find 
it justified and necessary to compensate that ―through the doctrine of peremptory norms or 
universal law applicable to all states‖ and, in some circumstances, ―expanding the concept of 
international law to include soft law.‖31 So, one of the underlying assumptions of this research 
is that there is a hierarchy in international law and jus cogens norms form the top of it.  
Second, based on the UN Charter
32
, human rights, together with the prohibition of the use of 
force and people‘s right to self-determination form the core of the international legal system. 
Article 1 of the Charter establishes the purposes or ―common ends‖ of the United Nations, 
naming the maintenance of ―international peace and security‖, development of ―friendly 
relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-
                                                 
28
  Ibid 
29
  Nieto-Navia, R., 2001, p 4 
30
  Ibid  
31
  Ibid 
32
  UN Charter is strongly valid starting-point for this analysis because of its very wide acceptance by the states, 
its constitutional character, forming a basis for the organisation uniting all of the countries in the world. Thus, as 
argued in in Shelton, D., 2006, besides some of the human rights norms, also such rules as the prohibition of the 
use of force and the obligation to settle disputes peacefully deriving from the Charter could be considered jus 
cogens norms as norms ―deemed basic for the international community‖ (p 304). Thus, the supremacy clause of 
the United Nations Charter set forth in Article 103, "has been taken to suggest that the aims and purposes of the 
United Nations - maintenance of peace and security, and promotion and protection of human rights - constitute 
an international public order to which other treaty regimes and the international organizations giving effect to 
them must conform.‖ (p 293, footnote 11). Erica de Wet in her article about international constitutional order (to 
be referred below) proposes namely UN Charter as the constitution for this order.  
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determination of peoples‖ and ―encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental 
freedoms‖33 The interconnectidness of these notions is well presented in an article authored 
by Erica De Wet, where, referring to several other authors, she concludes that despite a 
limited number of norms have achieved jus cogens status, most of them are human rights 
norms and that ―UN Charter‘s normative framework [...] has been the catalyst for the 
development of a legal order based on hierarchically superior values, as opposed to one 
exclusively based on the ‗equilibrium or value of sovereigns‘.‖34  
Third, from the practical point of view, I stick to the notion of the priority of clearly 
established norms in positive law (with the assumption that when contravening jus cogens 
norms/erga omnes obligations the norm will be void a priori). Customary law (although 
equally authoritative) comes in when there is no norm established in treaties.
35
 The role of 
general principles of international law (and standards and values contained in them) is to give 
a guiding light when there is no suitable norm, there is a conflict between equal level norms 
or for the interpretation of the norm.
36
 Being ‗recognised by civilised nations‘ those principles 
form such a common value-network of international legal system that gives a surrounding or 
background according to which all the concrete norms need to be applied and interpreted. 
This approach reflects the idea of Martti Koskenniemi about ―the three modes of juristic 
discourse, distinguished from the more concrete towards the more abstract as the modes of 
control, exegesis and philosophy.‖37 
Forth, as discussed by Dinah Shelton (cited above), the notion of ‗soft law‘ is not clearly 
defined and its legal value is not determined, however some points of application can be 
made: ‗soft law‘ often precedes or accompanies ‗hard law‘ (e.g. The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (1948) preceded the two covenants of human rights of the UN (1966)), some 
‗soft law‘ provides an authoritative interpretation of ‗hard law‘ (e.g. General Comments of 
different bodies of the UN), and, very importantly, ―compliance with nonbinding norms can 
                                                 
33
 UN General Assembly, Charter of the United Nations, San Francisco, 26 June 1945, art 1 
https://www.un.org/en/documents/charter  [accessed 20/03/2014] 
34
  De Wet, E., ―The International Constitutional Order―, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 55, 
2006, pp 51-76, p 59 
35
  That does not mean that norms of customary law should be considered possessing less legal force, turning to 
unwritten law on only when there is no equivalent in a written law is simply more convenient from the practical 
point of view. Thus, very many customary law norms are codified in treaties, conventions etc.  
36
 E.g. ICJ North Sea Continental Shelf cases, 20/02/1969, Summary of the Judgement, available at:  
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?sum=295&p1=3&p2=3&k=cc&case=51&p3=0 [accessed 20/03/2014] 
―There was no question of the Court's decision being ex aequo et bono. It was precisely a rule of law that called 
for the application of equitable principles, and in such cases as the present ones the equidistance method could 
unquestionably lead to inequity.‖  
37
  Koskinniemi, M., ―Hierarchy in International Law: A Sketch‖, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 8, 
1997, pp 566-582, p 568-570, the three modes are interconnected and ―normally set themselves again in 
hierarchical relationships‖ depending from the perspective and situation.  
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lead to the formation of customary international law‖, furthermore it can provide ―the 
necessary statement of legal obligation (opinio juris) to evidence the emergent custom‖ and 
―assist[…] in establishing the content of the norm.‖38 Thus, ―the process of drafting and 
voting for nonbinding normative instruments may also be considered a form of state 
practice.‖39  
And fifth, court decisions, as laid out in the ICJ Statute, constitute a subsidiary source of 
international law that can be used as an authoritative interpretation of norms and principles or 
a practice determining the status of a norm or principle as a part of (customary) international 
law or a general principle of international law. These functions of court decisions are relevant 
and necessary when the primary sources of law are either ambivalent or there is no clear 
regulation on some issue in law, i.e. the court decision might indicate a ‗hole‘ in written law.  
To sum up, the role of international law is to provide stability and control in international 
relations, therefore the principle pacta sunt servanda is one of the underlying principles of 
international law. That does not mean, however, that any agreement is permissible or any 
norm, once established, is valid forever, no matter what the consequences. In other words, 
legal positivism should be valued in international law, denouncing some norms or introducing 
new norms and principles must be rather conservative and rare, otherwise the law would lose 
its normative value and authority. At the same time it should borne in mind that the law is not 
‗carved into stone‘, it should reflect the reality in which it operates and serve the ‗common 
good of humanity.‘ Otherwise there is no need for the law. In words of Martti Koskenniemi: 
―The law is for stability but equally for change, and which of its contradictory aspects is 
stressed cannot be determined from within the law itself.‖40 He concludes:  
―Were the law merely an application of past hierarchies to present events it would undermine the 
individuality of cases and impose homogeneity over difference, enshrining a bureaucratic culture of 
blind obedience. That there is no closure to the reversal of hierarchies is a liberating experience; and 
just possibly the only way in which law can be an art of the just.‖41 
So, the fact that the right to truth is not explicitly established in international treaties does not 
necessarily mean that this right is non-existent. Below I try to shed some light on whether and 
how could the right to truth be seen through the lenses of international human rights law.  
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  Shelton, D., 2006, pp 319-322 
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  Koskenniemi, M., 1997, p 577 
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  Idem, p 582, referring to Derrida, J., ―Force of Law: The "Mystical Foundation of Authority‖, in Carlson, D., 
Cornell, D. and Rosenfeld, M. (eds.), ―Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice‖, 1992, pp 27-29 (footnote 
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1.1. The Right to Truth as an Autonomous Right 
1.1.1. The Right to Truth as a Norm of Customary International Law 
According to the Statute of the International Court of Justice (hereinafter ICJ) international 
custom is an ―evidence of a general practice accepted as law‖42 (opinio iuris). In the context 
of human rights norms, Theodor Meron has proposed possible indicators for evaluating the 
customary law status of a norm in the context of international human rights law: ―first, the 
degree to which a statement of a particular right in one human rights instrument, especially a 
human rights treaty, has been repeated in other human rights instruments, and second, the 
confirmation of the right in national practice, primarily through the incorporation of the right 
in national laws.‖43 
The right to truth as an autonomous right of an individual arose in the context of humanitarian 
crises and has been carried by the idea of seeking for justice, especially in the periods of 
transition. Article 32 of the Additional Protocol I (1977) to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 
foresees expressis verbis the right of families to know the fate of their relatives.
44
 The same is 
enacted in article 24 (2) of the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from 
Enforced Disappearance:  
―Each victim has the right to know the truth regarding the circumstances of the enforced 
disappearance, the progress and results of the investigation and the fate of the disappeared person.‖45  
The European Court of Human Rights has repeatedly recognized that a government‘s failure 
to provide information concerning victims of enforced disappearance can even amount to a 
breach of article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights, the right to life;
46
 article 3, 
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  United Nations, Statute of the International Court of Justice, 18 April 1946, art. 38 (1) (b), available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3deb4b9c0.html [accessed 20/03/2014] 
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  Meron, T., ―Human Rights and Humanitarian Law as Customary Law―, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
1989, p. 93, reference in Naqvi, Y., ―The right to the truth in international law: fact or fiction?―, International 
Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 88, 2006, pp 245-273, p 254 
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  Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 8 June 1977, art 32, available at: 
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on=openDocument [accessed 14/03/2014] 
45
 UN General Assembly, International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance, 20 December 2006, art 24 (2), available at: 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CED/Pages/ConventionCED.aspx [accessed 14/03/2014], the Convention 
is ratified by 42 and signed by 93 states.  
46
 See e.g. Cyprus v. Turkey, 10/05/2001, 25781/94, para. 136, 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-59454 ―Having regard to the above considerations, 
the Court concludes that there has been a continuing violation of Article 2 on account of the failure of the 
authorities of the respondent State to conduct an effective investigation aimed at clarifying the whereabouts and 
fate of Greek-Cypriot missing persons who disappeared in life-threatening circumstances.‖ 
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the right not to be subjected to torture or any form of degrading or inhuman treatment
47
, a 
breach of the right to effective remedy and right to investigation
48
, a right to family life
49
. The 
African Commission on Human and Peoples‘ Rights‘ Principles and Guidelines on The Right 
of a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa implicitly recognises the right to truth as part of 
the right to effective remedy.
50
 The Inter-American Commission of Human Rights has 
expressed the same opinion in one of its landmark decisions, Velasquez Rodriguez:  
―The duty to investigate facts of this type continues as long as there is uncertainty about the fate of the 
person who has disappeared. Even in the hypothetical case that those individually responsible for 
crimes of this type cannot be legally punished under certain circumstances, the State is obligated to 
use the means at its disposal to inform the relatives of the fate of the victims and, if they have been 
killed, the location of their remains.‖51  
Taking into account the consensual condemnation of enforced disappearances as a crime 
against humanity,
52
 the fact that almost all states have ratified the Additional Protocol I to the 
Geneva Conventions (173 ratifications and 3 signatures), and numerous resolutions, reports 
and studies on the right to truth by different UN bodies and courts confirming the same 
right
53
, it might be said that the right to truth in the context of enforced disappearances and 
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 See e.g. Tas v. Turkey, 14/11/2000, 24396/94, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-
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acute anguish and uncertainty which he has suffered as a result and continues to suffer, the Court finds that the 
applicant may claim to be a victim of the authorities‘ conduct, to an extent which discloses a breach of Article 3 
of the Convention.‖ 
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 See e.g. 25/05/1998, Kurt v. Turkey, 24276/94, para. 140, 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-58198  ―In the view of the Court, where the relatives 
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effective remedy for the purposes of Article 13 entails, in addition to the payment of compensation where 
appropriate, a thorough and effective investigation capable of leading to the identification and punishment of 
those responsible and including effective access for the relatives to the investigatory procedure.‖ 
49
  Decision on Admissibility and Merits, “Srebrenica Cases”, 7/03/2003, CH/01/8365 et al., 
para. 220 (4); see also para. 191, reference in Naqvi, Y., 2006, p 264 
50
 ―The right to an effective remedy includes: […] access to the factual information concerning the violations.‖ 
And further ―The granting of amnesty to absolve perpetrators of human rights violations from accountability 
violates the right of victims to an effective remedy.‖ African Commission of Human and Peoples‘ Rights, 
Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa, adopted 24/10/2011, 
http://www.achpr.org/instruments/fair-trial/  
51
 IACHR, Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, 29/07/1988, 7920, para 181, available at: 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_04_ing.pdf One of the recent examples of the court 
upholding that decision is e.g. Guerrilha do Araguaia case where the court restated the obligation of the state to 
conduct investigation on disappearances, torture and murder, declaring the Brazilian 1970 amnesty laws illegal 
as inhibiting the fulfilment of these obligations. See IACHR, Gomes Lund et al. (“Guerrilha do Araguaia”) v. 
Brazil, 24/11/2010, e.g. para. 171 available at: http://corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_219_ing.pdf 
52
  UN General Assembly, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (last amended 2010), 17 July 1998, 
art 7 (1) (i), available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3a84.html [accessed 15/02/14] 
53
  To name some: OHCHR, Study on the right to the truth, Report E/CN.4/2006/91; UN Commission on Human 
Rights, Principles of Impuniy,  E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1; General Comment on the right to the truth in relation to 
enforced disappearance in UN General Assembly, A/HRC/16/48, pp 12-17; Human Rights Commission/Human 
Rights Council resolutions 2005/66; 9/11; 12/12; decision 2/105; IACHR, Velasquez Rodrıguez case; EctHR 
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other grave human rights violations has become a part of customary international law. 
Concerning the consequences of the crimes against humanity the right to truth operates as an 
empowerment and protection mechanism of the victims of such crimes. It is more 
complicated to draw the same conclusion in other areas relevant for human rights protection.  
The creation of truth commissions (e.g. in El Salvador 1992, in Germany 1992, in various 
countries in Latin-America etc.
54
) and special tribunals in an after-conflict settlement (like the 
ones for Rwanda
55
 or Yugoslavia
56
) shows the importance of dealing with the past and 
especially crimes against humanity in a process of reconciliation. ―Generally, legal acts 
establishing truth commissions ground themselves in the need of the victims, their relatives 
and the general society to know the truth about what has taken place; to facilitate the 
reconciliation process; to contribute to the fight against impunity; and to reinstall or to 
strengthen democracy and the rule of law.‖57 [emphasis added, M.R.] 
Some non-governmental organisations such as the World Conference against Racism, Racial 
Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance have also made declarations ―attesting to 
the importance of teaching about the facts and truth of the history, with a view to achieving a 
comprehensive and objective cognizance of the tragedies of the past.‖58 The Study on the 
Right to Truth is, according to its title, placed in a wider context of ‗protection and promotion 
of human rights‘. The cited parts refer to a wider circle of subjects than just the direct victims 
of the crimes against humanity or war crimes, mentioning inter alia the right to know the 
truth of the ‗general society‟. The same can be found in the preamble of the General 
Comment on the Right to Truth in relation to enforced disappearance:  
―The right to the truth is both a collective and an individual right. Each victim has the right to know 
the truth about violations that affected him or her, but the truth also has to be told at the level of 
society as a ―vital safeguard against the recurrence of violations.‖‖59  
                                                                                                                                                        
Cyprus v. Turkey, African Commission on Human Rights Communications in Amnesty International v. Sudan 
case (references in Naqvi, Y., 2006) 
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 See a list of different truth, reconciliation and inquiry commissions on the homepage of Amnesty 
International: http://www.amnesty.org/en/international-justice/issues/truth-commissions [accessed 2/04/2014] 
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 UN Security Council, Security Council Resolution S/RES/955 (1994), 8 November 1994, S/RES/955 
(1994), available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00f2742c.html [accessed 14 March 2014] 
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  UN Security Council, Resolution 808 (1993) Adopted by the Security Council at its 3175th meeting, on 22 
February 1993, 22 February 1993, S/RES/808 (1993), available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00f15d30.html, [accessed 14 March 2014] 
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 OHCHR, Promotion and Protection of Human Rights. Study on the Right to the Truth, Report 
E/CN.4/2006/91, 8 February 2006, available at: http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/7768495.67890167.html 
[accessed 20/03/2014] (hereinafter Study on the Right to Truth) 
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  UN General Assembly, General Comment on the right to the truth in relation to enforced disappearance, 
Report  of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, 26 January 2011,  A/HRC/16/48, pp 
18 
 
Declaring the importance of the teaching of history in a way that it would create ‗a 
comprehensive and objective cognizance of the tragedies of the past‘ namely by an 
organisation fighting against racism, xenophobia and intolerance related thereto vividly shows 
how revealing of truth about the past relates to other human rights and influences the present 
and the future. A UN Independent Expert on Minority Issues (then Gay MacDougall) in her 
annual report of 2010 pointed out that ―over 55 per cent of violent conflicts of a significant 
intensity between 2007 and 2009 had violations of minority rights or tensions between 
communities at their core‖ and drew the conclusion that ―attention to minority issues and 
minority rights violations at an early stage – before they lead to tensions and violence – would 
make an invaluable contribution to the culture of prevention within the United Nations, save 
countless lives and promote stability and development.‖60  
These observations well illustrate the ‗duty to remember‘, resembling also in the pedagogic-
messianist character of the criminal trials on crimes against humanity or comparable atrocities 
(discussed below) the landmark of which could be considered Nuremberg tribunals. In words 
of Réné Rémond:  
―The formation of these tribunals is built on the assumption that all political acts have a moral 
dimension, and attests to the emergence of the idea of the collective responsibility of humankind on a 
global scale. It is accompanied by another radical shift, which also affects our relationship to the past: 
the idea that some actions have no statute of limitations.‖61 [emphasis added, M.R.] 
As mentioned above, the right to truth has mainly been handled in the context of transitional 
justice or post-conflict peace-building. The main aim of revealing the truth in that phase is to 
prevent an escalation of a new violence – according to Tristan Anne Borer, that could be 
called a ‗negative‘ task of a ‗post-accord‘ or ‗post-agreement‘ (that is a phase after the formal 
ending of war) peace-building activity.
62
 At the same time there is a ‗positive‘ task to remove 
the underlying causes of the conflict: ―the dual challenge for peace builders in the period 
following an agreement includes preventing a relapse into war while simultaneously 
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  OHCHR, News and Events, ―Early attention to minority rights a key tool for stability and conflict prevention 
– states UN expert‖, New York, 20/10/2010, available at: 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=10472&LangID=E [accessed 
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 Rémond, R., ―History and the Law‖, Études no. 4046, 2006, available at: http://www.lph-
asso.fr/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=154&Itemid=184%27E8=en [accessed 12/04/2014] 
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―Telling the Truths: Truth telling and Peace Building in Post-Conflict Societies‖, Notre Dame 2006, University 
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constructing a self-sustaining peace.‖63 It is clear that at least for sustainable, lasting peace the 
truth needs to be revealed in the society as a whole, not only among direct victims: the right to 
know the truth is, as declared in the above-referred UN study, possessed by the ‗general 
society.‘64 The literature on transitional justice confirms the same conclusion, e.g. Borer 
argues that: ―Truth is not only the basic condition for overcoming the past but also the basic 
condition for developing a nonviolent perspective for the future.‖65 
From the point of reconciliation specifically it has been rightly argued by Juan Mendez: 
―In the first place, true reconciliation cannot be imposed by decree; it has to be built in the hearts and 
minds of all members of society through a process that recognizes every human being's worth and 
dignity. Second, reconciliation requires knowledge of the facts. Forgiveness cannot be demanded (or 
even expected) unless the person who is asked to forgive knows exactly what it is that he or she is 
forgiving. […]‖66 [emphasis added M.R] 
The same conclusion finds explicit confirmation in the Addendum of the Report of the 
Principles of Impunity
67
 that sets forth ‗the right to know‘ composed of the following 
principles: ―the inalienable right to the truth; the duty to preserve memory; the victims‘ right 
to know; guarantees to give effect to the right to know‖. Principle 2 of the Principles of 
Impunity reads as follows:  
―Every people has the inalienable right to know the truth about past events concerning the perpetration 
of heinous crimes and about the circumstances and reasons that led, through massive or systematic 
violations, to the perpetration of those crimes. Full and effective exercise of the right to the truth 
provides a vital safeguard against the recurrence of violations.‖ 68  
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As indicated above, the focus point of this research is the right to historical truth, the creation 
of historical narrative as a part of nation building process in peace-time. Is it now, when the 
truth commissions have done their job, just up to the state to decide how to present history or 
is that somehow still also a ―legitimate concern of the international community‖69 as human 
rights are claimed to be? The opinions of transitional law (and other
70
) scholars and examples 
mentioned above illustrate, if not a priori juridical applicability, then at least practical 
importance of the right to truth at any time in any society. Thus, it is not logical that the right 
to truth, arousing from acts (crimes against humanity) without any ‗statute of limitation‘ ends 
in a certain period of time, in practice that would mean a temporal restriction also on the acts 
themselves.  
1.1.2. The Contours of the Right to Truth as a Norm of Customary International Law 
Based on the development of the right to truth in international legal acts, court practice and 
national practice described above, a ―two-track evolution‖71 is noticeable, giving that the right 
to truth invokes in case of:  
―(1) single violations of human rights that entail individual and case-specific remedies (i.e., for the 
victim or victim‘s family), as reflected in the jurisprudence of human rights courts and monitoring 
bodies, and (2) mass violations of human rights that necessitate a broader inquiry into the reasons and 
causes for such violence (i.e., for society in general) as established by the practice of truth 
commissions or commissions of inquiry and in resolutions of the UN General Assembly and Security 
Council.‖72  
Concluding that way, the right to truth rather applies in the direct aftermath of a conflict or 
remedying a violation of a human right. I claim that the right to truth not only has links and 
narrative importance also outside this restricted scope but also legal meaning and effect.  
1.1.2.1. The Right to Truth and the Right to Information – Differences and Inter-Relations 
The right to receive truthful and impartial information is one of the corner-stones of a 
democratic society. As put by Subash Kashyap, a leading authority of constitutional law and 
politics in India: "Information today equals power, and in a democracy power belongs to the 
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people."
73
 Indeed, the right to ―seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds‖74 
is a prerequisite for enjoying other fundamental rights such as the freedom of expression, 
freedom of thought and conscience, the right to education, the right to a fair trial, the right to 
participate in democratic processes, the right to assembly etc. Taking into account the 
enormous and constantly growing amount of information, the very wide application of the 
freedom of expression, the importance of public debate and ability of anyone to share his 
thoughts and contest the ones of others, some rules and limits on this agora apply. Different 
rights might limit each-other, the public order and safety or other human rights might 
constitute a legitimate basis, ‗necessary in a democratic society‘ to use terms of ECHR, for 
the restrictions of any of those rights.
75
  
In large number of cases the truth forms the centre of these rules – it is not imaginable that 
these rights could be enjoyed in a lack of information, say as a result of arbitrary prohibition 
of its emanation, by allowing deliberately false information or providing no mechanisms for 
people to protect themselves from the dissemination of wrongful information about them.
76
 In 
that sense, the role of the right to truth could be seen as of the general principle of 
international law, comparable to the principle of bona fide, as will be discussed below.  
On the norm level, however, it is necessary to make a distinction between the right to truth 
and the right to information. As put forth by Meron, for deciding whether a right could be 
considered as customary norm of international law one has to consider ―the degree to which a 
particular right is subject to limitations (claw-back clauses) and the extent of contrary 
practice.‖77 The right to information as other rights mentioned above may be restricted, it is 
not an absolute right as for example the right not to be subjected to torture or any other form 
of degrading or inhuman treatment.
78
 E.g. the famous case of Edward Snowden illustrates the 
tendency to limit the publishing of information, even if it contains important information 
about the breaches of fundamental rights (like the right to privacy, secrecy of correspondence 
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etc.) using a justification of state security.
79
 The right to truth, as discussed above, is related to 
the implementation of international criminal law, to the ―serious violations of international 
humanitarian or human rights law‖80; the judgements of international and regional courts 
referred above have indicated that ―a failure to inform people of the fate and whereabouts of 
missing relatives may amount to torture — clearly a jus cogens crime.‖81 Very importantly, 
ECtHR, referring to several UN documents on the right to truth, in El-Masri case explicitly 
recognised the right to truth as deriving from article 3 of the ECHR
82
, holding that  
―an unjustifiably broad interpretation of State secret privilege had been asserted by the US 
Government in proceedings before US courts in that case, and that the same approach had led the 
Macedonian authorities to hide the truth. In the context of the secret detention, rendition and torture 
programme of the Bush-era CIA, […] the concept of State secrets ―has often been invoked to obstruct 
the search for the truth.‖‖83  
So the right to truth, although not explicitly enacted as a human right, is paradoxically, in 
contrast to the right to information which is, mainly in connection to the freedom of 
expression, enacted and widely approved as such, a stronger concept, forming a prerequisite 
for proper implementation of jus cogens norms. The customary norm of the right to truth 
should therefore not be equated with the right to information – the right to truth as a norm of 
customary character derives from different sources and applies in different context than the 
right to information. Taken the right to truth as a pre-requisite ―to vindicate other essential 
rights, such as the right to life and the right not to be subjected to torture, it is difficult to 
justify limitations or derogations to its application.‖84 The Study on the Right to Truth states:  
―The right to the truth as a stand-alone right is a fundamental right of the individual and therefore 
should not be subject to limitations. Giving its inalienable nature and its close relationship with other 
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non-derogable rights, such as the right not  to be subjected to torture and ill-treatment, the right to the 
truth should be treated as a  non-derogable right.‖85 
Nevertheless, there are also significant similarities. The distinction between the value 
judgements and facts presentation in the context of the freedom of expression and right to 
information and the concepts of forensic and narrative truth (discussed below) in the context 
of the right to truth are very similar in their character. In both cases the facts can be proven 
and controlled, while the value judgement or narrative cannot; in both cases established and 
proven facts set limits to the formulation of value judgements or narratives. Thus, the criterion 
of authenticity of the information in cases of ‗whistle-blowing‘ clearly refers to the query of 
truthfulness of the information in question. So the right to information includes the right to 
truth in its own sphere of application. As the Study on the Right to Truth states, ―the right to 
seek information may be an instrumental right to realize the right to the truth, but both 
constitute different and separate rights.‖86 
Moreover, as for the judicial procedures or other legal mechanisms involving the application 
of the right to truth, the right to information could serve as a credible source of analogy and 
interpretation. As areas where the freedom of expression and information is particularly 
important, (such as journalism, court trials, book publishing etc.) are also among main 
grounds for the preservation, structuring and analysis of the past atrocities and shaping the 
memory, especially in difficult times when also the right to truth arouses, the concepts may 
intervene and even overlap, applying at the same time and moulding each-other. Hate speech 
could be an example of that (as is well exemplified by Holocaust denial cases discussed 
below). 
However, the right to truth as an independent concept has developed and been invoked in a 
totally different context than the right to information – its roots and necessity lay in a jure 
belli or post belli or situations analogous or close to that, it operates as an initial guarantor of 
the human dignity and the humanity as such, pre-requisite for the implementation of jus 
cogens norms. The right to information definitely posits itself in the jure paci, protecting 
foremost rights guaranteeing the (political) participation in public life. So when talking about 
the historical knowledge of past atrocities, we are in the first place talking about the right to 
truth which for the named reasons a priori cannot be subjected to limitations such as those 
legitimately limiting the right to information. To bring an example from the peace time case 
law that could be considered upholding the right to truth, such rulings as those of Paul 
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Touvier, Maurice Papon or Klaus Barbie in France could be named. In those cases the French 
courts invoked the article on the non-prescription of the crimes against humanity, the actual 
significance and aim of those processes was considered to be, together with the avoiding of 
impunity, to reveal and clarify historical truth.
87
 As Leila Wexler observes in her study on the 
case of Touvier, it was ―the trial of the whole French society and not just one man.‖88  
As the last difference, the collective nature of the right to truth must be mentioned. While the 
right to information can be invoked by individuals who can prove to be in a status of a victim 
of a human rights violation and show that the violation is entirely or partly caused by the false 
propaganda, the right to truth has an appeal also as a collective right. In the period of 
transition, the truth commissions and other mechanisms dealing with the past are meant 
namely for the whole society, not only direct victims.
89
  
The French cases, however, show that, even if not explicitly mentioned, the right to truth 
invokes also in peace time society in cases concerning historical truth about past atrocities. 
Taken together with the more and more acknowledged ‗duty to remember‘90 it might be said 
that the right to truth cannot be limited to the period of transition. 
1.1.2.2. The Rationae Temporis of the Right to Truth 
The temporal application of the right to truth is very difficult to limit to a certain period in an 
aftermath of a conflict or some other event evoking it. That would not be too convenient from 
the practical point of view either as it presumes that one needs to wait for the outset of 
atrocities (or even some consequences) before anything could be claimed or done on a wider 
societal scale, which would not comply with the obligation of the prevention of such crimes 
or the obligation of the maintenance of peace and security deriving from the UN Charter.  
Sometimes it is not even possible to reveal or find out all the relevant facts and circumstances 
of the tragedy in question in a soon aftermath of the events. Historical research takes time. 
The referred processes of the French Nazi collaborators vividly illustrate this situation. Some 
important parts of French history were lost in the post-war nation building process where 
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France attempted to distance itself from the circle of the perpetrators of the Nazi regime. That 
left the people who were victimised by French Nazi collaborators out of the nation building 
process in a new post-conflict society.
91
 Talking about the historiography and ―historical 
representations‖ of the nations, John Torpey concludes that ―states can no longer ignore the 
subterranean histories of the many groups submerged or oppressed in the nation building 
process.‖92  
But there can also be, and often are, very practical reasons that make the proper fulfilling of 
the right to truth impossible in transitional period. Tina Rosenberg brings an example of the 
difference between Latin American and Communist transitions – the transition from ―criminal 
regime‖ and ―regime of criminals‖ respectively – and argues that it is easier to hold processes 
over collaborators when there is a small circle of responsibles.
93
 Thus, the fact that it ―took 
years until the full extent of Jewish catastrophe was revealed to the victors‖ well illustrates 
that history, written on a trial in the close aftermath of the conflict faces the challenge of 
interpretation that will necessarily ―be based on fragmentary evidence and influenced by 
interpretations by contemporaries with a concrete stake in the result.‖94  
Moreover, Torpey points out the weaknesses deriving from the concept of the transitional 
justice as such undermining the proper dealing with the past and satisfying people‘s rights 
connected to the right to truth: first, it pursues ―foreshortened time horizons‖, a ―view that the 
past […] begun only the day before yesterday,‖ and second, it pays ―disproportionate 
attention to regime changes.‖95  
―In contrast to the historical shallowness of the transitional justice paradigm, many of the historical 
injustices[,] [the] demands for repair of the subterranean past concern heinous regimes and actions that 
may stretch back hundreds of years or they may impugn political and social orders whose flaws for 
particular groups have only recently grown politically salient.‖96 
As already discussed, it is not even clear when does the period of transition end. Thus, it is 
not reasonable to declare the right serving as a restorative mechanism of justice and peace not 
to apply in situations where manipulated or biased information creates or preserves the causes 
of the crisis. Furthermore, ―it should also be borne in mind that those rights most crucial to 
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the protection of human dignity and of universally accepted values of humanity require a 
lesser amount of confirmatory evidence of their customary character.‖97 
So, there is a very reasonable basis to assume that the memory laws and politics, as peace-
time measures dealing with the atrocious legacy of the past, come under the auspices of the 
right to truth.  
1.2. The Right to Truth as a General Principle of International Law 
We have an underlying assumption that the education provided in schools should be truthful, 
that media should provide impartial information, that judges should base their decisions on 
truthful facts etc. As stated above, the right to truth as a notion is ‗crucial to the protection of 
human dignity and of universally accepted values of humanity‘. So, applying the terms of 
general legal theory, the right to truth may be too wide, encompassing too much to define it as 
a legal norm but is definitely way too important and widely accepted and applied to exclude 
from the international-legal domain. In other words, the right to truth has characteristics of a 
legal principle.
98
  
The opinions of scholars about the sources and the level of generalisation of the norms 
reaching the substance of a general principle of international law vary significantly. The 
starting-points of the approaches – similarly to the ones on jus cogens norms – range from 
strict positivist
99
 to highly naturalist
100
. However, ―the majority of scholars believe that article 
38 (I) (3) of the Statute of the PCIJ and article 38 (1) (c) of the ICJ Statute envision or imply 
that "General Principles" can be identified from two different legal sources - national and 
international.‖101 The general principle of international law must be pursued as a ―common 
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denominator‖ that ―exists between all legal systems‖.102 In words of Baron Descamps, the 
president of the Advisory Committee which drafted the Statute of the PCIJ:  
―The fundamental law of justice and injustice deeply engraved on the heart of every human being and 
which is given its highest and most authoritative expression in the legal conscience of civilized nations 
[exists in every legal system].‖
103
  
A little less emotional definition which could serve well here is given by Sir Hersch 
Lauterpacht:  
―[T]hose principles of law, private and public, which contemplation of the legal experience of 
civilized nations leads one to regard as obvious maxims of jurisprudence of a general and fundamental 
character... a comparison, generalization and synthesis of rules of law in its various branches – private 
and public, constitutional, administrative, and procedural – common to various systems of national 
law.‖
104
 
Taking into account the strong interrelation and resemblance of the right to truth with other 
human rights, the rule of law and democracy, the application of it by courts and other 
international investigative bodies, declaration in numerous international documents, 
acceptance by national legal systems and its derivation from the notion of ‗human dignity and 
of universally accepted values of humanity‘, the right to truth could be examined as a general 
principle of international law, compared to such principles as good faith or proportionality 
which are ―borrowed from national systems and are based on ―natural justice.‖‖105  
As mentioned above, differently from those principles, the right to truth has not found explicit 
mentioning in any human rights documents qualifying as ‗hard law‘ (with an exception of the 
Enforced Disappearances Convention, supported by Additional protocol I of the Geneva 
Conventions), ―but rather in authoritative interpretations of otherwise binding norms.‖106 
Therefore, as Mendez argues, the right to truth could be considered an ―emerging 
principle‖.107 He discusses the right to truth and its connections with binding human rights 
and international criminal law instruments, pointing out that the acts constituting crimes 
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against humanity infringe such ―core norms‖ of international law that ―cannot be suspended 
even in the event of an emergency that threatens the life of the nation or its national security. 
Immunity for these crimes constitutes an impermissible ex post facto derogation of rights 
which could not have been suspended at the time the acts were committed.‖108  
He argues that many such binding norms as those in e.g. Genocide or Torture conventions or 
customary norms ―point in the direction of an obligation to overcome impunity for crimes of 
this kind‖ and ―rule on the inapplicability of statutes of limitations to crimes against humanity 
[…].‖109 The unequivocal agreement that states are obliged to punish the perpetrators of such 
acts brings along the emergence of a set of new principles, expansion of ―universally 
applicable norms,‖ deriving from the more concrete tasks arousing from this obligation. These 
tasks include the obligation ―to disclose to the victims, their families, and society all that can 
be reliably established about those events‖ which corresponds to “a right to know the truth” 
of an “individual and collective persons.”110[italics added, M.R.] 
Koskenniemi argues that the fate of international law ―as a carrier of [...] the regulative idea of 
universal community, independent of particular interests or desires‖ is ―not a matter of re-
employing a limited number of professionals for more cost-effective tasks but of re-
establishing hope for the human species.‖111 In coherence with that idea it is argued that 
human rights are fulfilling a role of being ―a gentle civiliser of social systems.‖112 The role of 
the right to truth as described in this thesis highly coincides with this notion. Therefore I 
argue that the right to truth could actually be considered not ‗emerging‘ anymore but as an 
already established principle of international human rights law. This conclusion is also 
supported by the nature and system of international law and law in general which I will now 
briefly discuss. 
An obligation of a lawyer to tell the truth and the role of truth in legal system has been a topic 
of a widespread debate. The fact that truth or reliable evidence in courtroom does not always 
coincide with the truth in ‗real life‘ has often caused frustration and lead to accusations 
towards lawyers being immoral liers and the sphere of law far from reality and justice. It has 
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been proposed to derive from the fact that different theories of truth are applied in social and 
legal spheres of life: correspondence theory and coherence theory respectively.
113
  
In short, there are certain traits and principles in legal realm that essentially modify the 
perception of facts, truthfulness and decision making process compared to everyday life. ―In 
contrast to the coherence theory of truth is the correspondence theory, resulting from the 
belief that statements are true by virtue of their correspondence to states of affairs in the 
world.‖114 An intellectual property and commercial disputes lawyer Eric Bjorgum argues that 
the need for a different conception of truth in legal system lays in uncertainty: ―It is almost a 
given that the fact finder will never know the truth, in the correspondent sense: unless the act 
at issue occurs in the court room. […] the legal system functions on the coherent model of 
truth primarily because of uncertainty. […]‖115 This is why we need ―procedural safeguards or 
values‖ potentially contradicting the correspondent truth.116  
So, the coherence-conception is not a different virtue but a tool to meet practical needs. 
Drawing an analogy with above-referred Mendez‘s argumentation about the relationship 
between truth and justice, it might be said that like the truth does not replace justice as a 
means of avoiding due judicial procedure, so does the legal coherence conception not replace 
or remove the actual underlying purpose of every judicial proceeding – to reveal the truth.  
Thus, as Bjorgum proves, the truth has an ―inherent value‖ in legal system as such, i.e. the 
system cannot function without some requirement of truth. The value of truth is not only 
―instrumental‖ because in that case ―we must accept that lack of truth, or lying, could be just 
as good instrumentally (depending on the circumstance),‖ but this is something we cannot 
accept as ―lying is logically and empirically flawed. Thus, the original premise was wrong, 
and therefore its opposite must be true – truth is at least its own inherent good,‖117 
constituting an ‗obvious maxim of jurisprudence of a general and fundamental character.‘ 
In short, the assumption that the right to truth operates as a general underlying principle basis 
itself already in the very characterisation of the system of the law but is also reasonably 
arguable under the concept and theory about general principles of international law. In regard 
of the historical truth and information about past atrocities, ―[t]he right to truth as an emerging 
principle of international human rights law shapes states‘ duties in relation to dealing with the 
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past.‖118 Mendez sees the emerging principle of the right to truth in human rights law 
applying ―to human rights crimes particularly severe of nature, such as extrajudicial 
executions, disappearances, and torture, when they take place as part of a deliberate, 
systematic, or widespread pattern[,] […] acquire[ing] the status of crimes against 
humanity.‖119  
The crimes against humanity do not expire. As stated in article 29 of the Rome Statute, ―[t]he 
crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court shall not be subject to any statute of limitations.‖120 
As argued above, the same is confirmed about investigation and punishment of such crimes in 
many other international-legal documents and the obligation to reveal the truth giving rise to 
the right to truth has therefore established itself as a ‗norm of universal applicability‘. So, if 
the crimes against humanity do not expire, does logically not expire the right to truth about 
them either. That would constitute an ‗ex post facto derogation of rights which could not have 
been suspended at the time the acts were committed.‘  
Therefore, in coherence with the described role and nature of truth in the sphere of law, and 
the role of international law and human rights law in particular (to be a ‗gentle civilizer‘), it 
can be argued that the right to truth in peace-time applies as a general principle of 
international law. It is appropriate to conclude with a very apposite quote from Eric Bjorgum:  
―Truth occupies a central position in the values of our coherent legal system along with equality, 
fairness, consistency and justice, however defined. But truth is actually the value that is most at work 
in the system. Once conceptions of the other values are in place, we need to go about the everyday 
task of trying to find out what actually happened, and this is a discussion of truth.‖121  
I further analyse, what could be considered the core content of the right to truth.  
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1.3. The Content of the Notion of Truth  
―The truth is rarely pure and never simple.‖  
Oscar Wilde, The Importance of Being Earnest (1895) 
In large, there are two main approaches to the notion of truth: correspondent and relativist.
122
 
The first derives from an assumption that truth or truthfulness objectively exists,123 second 
takes the standpoint that truth only derives from subjective traits and interests of the evaluator 
and varies depending on the situation and moment.124 
This raises the question of the difference between a belief and truth. Michel Foucault has 
dedicated lots of his research on finding out, why and how do beliefs change, the question for 
Foucault is the inner dynamics, the power and authority relations in the scientific system 
itself.
125
 ―The state authority is simultaneously individualising and totalising form of 
authority,‖126 he claims. He argues that the modern Western state has integrated into its new 
political form an old Christian institutions‘ power-technique, which he calls ―pastoral power‖ 
– a form of authority, directed to ―salvation‖, being ―sacrificing (as opposite to the principle 
of sovereignty); individualising (as opposite to legal power), far-reaching and long-lasting as 
life; it is connected to the production of the truth – individual‟s own truth‖
127
 [emphasis 
added, M.R.] 
Nowadays, Foucault argues, the heavenly salvation has been replaced with the guaranteeing 
of that on the Earth. ―In this context the word ―salvation‖ obtains many different meanings: 
health, welfare (sufficient wealth, living-standard), safety, protection from an accident.‖128 
The pastoral authority – that had for centuries been connected to one religious institution – 
has spread ―in the whole social body,‖129 so for ―the actual and effective implementation of 
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power‖ it has become necessary for the authority ―to become able to find access to the bodies, 
deeds, attitudes and ways of everyday behaviour of individuals.‖130 
This train of thought well reflects the central question of this research: how far can a state go 
in producing ‗individual truth‘, i.e. shaping or influencing person‘s identity? Is any 
presentation or handling of historical facts justified to build a strong national identity, to 
‗make people feel good‘? How does the right to truth as a general principle or customary 
norm of international human rights law change or influence the picture?  
Hannah Arendt has argued that ―the surest long-term result of brainwashing is a peculiar kind 
of cynicism – an absolute refusal to believe in the truth of anything, no matter how well this 
truth may be established.‖131 Contrary to the whole post-modernist predominantly or entirely 
relativist way of thinking, factual truth in its ―stubborn thereness‖132 is an absolute truth 
―whose validity needs no support from the side of opinion.‖133 In that way facts have coercive 
force over opinions, ―persuasion or dissuasion is useless‖ – quoting Grotius, ―even God 
cannot cause two times two not to make four.‖134  
Arendt, similarly to Foucalt‘s metaphor of ‗salvation‘, concludes that the sphere of politics 
initially derives from the need ―to take care of life‘s necessities,‖ the ability not to take 
everything as it is (i.e. as is the truth) gives us the capacity to improve, to change the world.
135
  
In that sense politics in its attitude toward facts must ―tread the very narrow path between the 
danger of taking them as the results of some necessary development which men could not 
prevent‖ or do anything about it ―and the danger of denying them, of trying to manipulate 
them out of the world.‖136 The balancing and protection of the truth in politics has to come 
from outside the political sphere and namely for that reason has the governing principle or 
―the highest criterion of speech and endeavour‖ of such fields as law and higher education 
always been, ―contrary to all political rules, truth and truthfulness.‖137  
As will be further shown, the protection of the factual truth being manipulated out of the 
world is the core substance of the right to truth.  
                                                 
130
  Foucault, M., ―Truth and Power‖, in Tamm, M., 2011, p 250 
131
  Arendt, H., ―Truth and Politics‖, in Arendt, H., ―Between Past and Future‖, Penguin Books, New York, 
1977, reissued 1993, pp 227-264, p 257 
132
  Ibid 
133
  Idem, p 233 
134
  Idem, p 240 
135
  Arendt, H., 1993, p 259  
136
  Ibid 
137
  Idem, p 260 
33 
 
1.4. Conclusion 
The right to truth in the direct conflict-aftermath could be considered:  
a) an autonomous right to know the fate of one‘s relatives in case of forced 
disappearances in humanitarian law (art 32 of the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949) and human rights law (The International Convention for the 
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance art. 24 (2)); 
b) a norm of customary international law constituting a right to know the truth of the 
‗general society‘ when crimes against humanity or other grave human rights violations 
have taken place in society – i.e. the right to historical truth;  
c) a norm of customary international law constituting a right to know of an individual 
who has become a victim (including heirs) of human rights violation(s) (not limited to 
the events of enforced disappearances only).  
There is a slightly grey area about the status and applicability of the right to truth in ‗normal‘ 
times. Although extremely important prerequisite and indicator of democracy and rule of law, 
application of jus cogens norms, ‗crucial to the protection of human dignity and of universally 
accepted values of humanity‘, the status of the right to truth as a norm of customary 
international law in peace-time society without a situation of enforced disappearance or any 
comparable human rights violation, is still debatable because of not directly fulfilling  the 
criteria of the Statute of ICJ: being grounded in general practice and opinio juris. Or, to use 
Meron‘s yardsticks for human rights law named above: in that way it has not been established 
(or repeated) in any human rights treaty or other act, nor has it been largely adopted by states 
into their domestic law or confirmed by courts‘ practice.138 
That, however, concerns the explicit dealing with the ‗right to truth‘. If one would consider 
the establishment in general practice and opinio juris through a teleological interpretation, 
relieving the criterion from the expressis verbis mentioning to contextual or implicit one, 
there would be far less doubt that the right to truth attains the threshold of a customary norm 
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of international law also in peace-time. Based on the brought examples, I conclude that if 
human rights are considered a ‗legitimate concern of the international community‘, so should 
be the right to truth, not only as an independent right but, more relevantly for the purposes of 
this research, as an inevitable part and a prerequisite for effective implementation of other 
human rights. In that way the right to truth in peace-time functions as a general principle of 
international human rights law.  
2. The Right to Historical Truth  
―Historians owe historical truth not only to the living but to the dead.‖139 
In this chapter I will analyse whether and how this poignant phrase resonates in the human 
rights law and the right to truth. The shortcomings of the transitional justice described above 
and the ‗belated trials‘ over old men and women for the crimes committed half a century ago, 
let alone reparation claims for slavery (also triggering the need to deal with historical facts) 
that took place more than a century ago, strikingly show that it does.  
It is widely agreed that the preservation of the memory of past tragedies is necessary in order 
to avoid recurrence of such events in the future and to respect the dignity and memory of 
victims, survivors and their heirs. The so called ‗duty to remember‘ articulated after the 
World War II has obtained new connotations and expressions, the past belongs to the present 
and determines the future.
140
 The full title of the Genocide Convention reads: The Convention 
on the Prevention and Punishment of The Crime of Genocide. Article 1 of the Convention sets 
out the main idea and purposes of the convention:  
―The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, 
is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish.‖141 
The same is expressed in the preamble of the Rome Statute about crimes against humanity, 
aiming to ―put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus to contribute to 
the prevention of such crimes.‖142  
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The ―trials involving genocide or crimes against humanity are less about judging a person 
than about establishing the truth of the events.‖143 Deterrence and retribution could be 
considered the two main aims of these trials.
144
 The ability of the trial in achieving such aims 
has been critically questioned. Taking the criminal trial as it is – focusing on concrete subjects 
(perpetrators) and their guilt – the deterrence aim would assume a ―criminal intent against 
which a person can be persuaded.‖145 The mass atrocities of 20th sadly-ironically have been 
carried not by criminal intent ―but as offshoots from the desire to good.‖146  
In situations where the acts constituting a crime against humanity are ―aspects of political 
normality‖ or ―take place in exceptional situations of massive destruction and personal danger 
when there is little liberty of action‖, the ability to resist demands certain heroism which is 
not in the capacity of the criminal law to teach to people.
147
 Having such heroism in the centre 
of the confrontation, especially when the trial is perceived as ‗victors‘ justice‘ might even lead 
to opposite outcomes, enabling the perpetrators present themselves as martyrs and affirm the 
righteousness of the ideology that normalised and caused the atrocities.
148
 As for the 
retribution argument, the critique is directed first to the immeasurability of the harm caused 
by mass atrocities and the selectiveness of the trials – it is impossible to hold all the 
wrongdoers accountable.  
These are the reasons for which arguments are raised, despite Hannah Arendt‘s powerful 
critique concerning Eichmann trial in 1961
149, in support of the ‗show trials‘, declaring an 
obligation ―to conduct liberal show trials in traumatized societies‖ or arguing that ―trials have 
a function not only for justice but also pedagogy.‖150 This approach, called a ‗symbolic 
function‘ of the criminal law by Koskenniemi, is by some authors handled under the term 
‗expressivism‘ which aims at normative condemnation of such crimes that are ‗crimes against 
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humanity‘ (literally, in ―non-technical‖ sense) so that the message of morality, the narration 
created would be ―addressed across boundaries, to former enemy groups as well as 
generations, in order to ensure that lessons are not forgotten.‖151 
First, as argued further by Elander on an example of the Extraordinary Chambers in the 
Courts of Cambodia, this approach does not fulfil its purpose of giving the victims back their 
dignity and dealing with the whole ―complexity of human vulnerability in participating in 
atrocities‖, picking up ―a simplistic narrative of innocence and victimhood‖ which in 
Cambodian case, where many victims were the cadre of Khmer Rouge and 93 per cent of the 
population considers themselves victims, definitely failed.
152
 As a remark, I think this 
example very accurately reflects the Communist regime, and especially Stalinism, as well:  
―[T]he victims at Tuol Seng [genocide museum, M.R.] face the visitor as anonymous illustrations if 
imprisonment and torture in an urban context. For the vast majority of Cambodians who lived through 
the Khmer Rouge period, this is at odds with their experiences of rural life, famine, forced labor and 
terror.‖153 
Second, to be able to actually grasp the whole complexity of the events, time and distance is 
needed. It is well exemplified by trials of David Irving
154
 in UK and Ernst Zündel155 in 
Canada where professional historians were needed to make a decision. In the David Irving 
trial the court held that Deborah Lipstadt was not defaming David Irving when writing in her 
book that he ―had manipulated and falsified historical documents; invented statistics; and 
mistranslated, misconstructed, and misused historical sources and historical works in his own 
publications in order to serve the cause of ―Holocaust denial,‖ his own extreme right-wing 
and anti-Semitic political views, and his ardent admiration for Adolf Hitler‖; and in Ernst 
Zündel trial that Zündel could not ―believe in good faith that these things [gas chambers and 
the mass murder of Jews, M.R.] had not happened‖156 and therefore, he had violated a rarely 
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invoked article 181 of Canadian Criminal Code that prohibits deliberate publishing of false 
information.
157
  
Although ―[k]nowledge has a different meaning and a different purpose for historians and 
lawyers; […] beyond this, […] both approaches to knowledge could find themselves gripped 
and instrumentalized by political imperatives dictated from outside when they became 
involved in such proceedings.‖158 Both – historians and lawyers – have to balance on the thin 
rope not to fall prey to political purposes, becoming a tool for political ‗power-games‘ and 
remain at the same time to be in a service of a common good in a society, to be 
democratically open. The judge has to stop the trial from becoming a ‗show trial‘ and 
simultaneously fulfil the task of ―convey[ing] an unambiguous historical truth to its 
audience.‖159 A historian when giving moral judgements ―should not be partial or biased, but 
[he] should judge when that is called for. This is to show respect, and has nothing to do with 
distorting historical facts.‖160 In the end of the day, both are aimed at one: establishing the 
truth about what happened.
161
  
So, the mechanism in legal sphere is needed to protect the truth about past events, allowing at 
the same time to preserve nature and credibility of the law and protect history-science when 
intervening with the former. The right to truth is the substance regulating both truth-seeking 
disciplines – history and law – and relations between them. The right to truth shall apply in 
above-described situations like the ones where facts and evidence are being deliberately 
falsified. It shall apply for historians in their profession and also for the state in using history 
in the creation of national identity.  
Moreover, the right to truth involves not only remembering but also forgetting that the hyper-
visibility of a trial or truth-commission might not properly enable.  
―Psychoanalysis teaches us that what is lost may not always be known and that grief may be 
misplaced. In melancholia, lost objects stay in the unconscious but they continue to haunt.‖162  
The right to the truth applies not as a ―melancholic tribunal‖163 but as a guarantor for the one 
forgetting (also when it is a societal level development) to be able to know what is to be 
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forgot. This aspect also illustrates why the principle of good faith is not enough in the 
situations like the ones under scrutiny here – it is possible to argue that hiding or somehow 
modifying facts to make people feel better was carried by the good faith and intensions, which 
might be perfectly true but which also might be used to justify a blame manipulation for 
populist ends. To distinguish between use and abuse of bona fide principle in these situations 
by clarifying the real intension is extremely difficult at best. The right to truth on the other 
hand protects the factual truth as such, not intention of action.  
2.1. Memory and History – Identity 
―History forms a nation.‖164 
Historical cognisance forms an inevitable part of the identity creation of both – an individual 
and a state. Ereshnee Naidu concludes her review essay on the book about the South-African 
TRC with the following conclusion: ―[M]emory is more than just another of the ‗soft‘ issues 
in the transitional justice field. Rather, it is central to questions of social justice and the rands 
and cents reality of postconflict reconciliation for ordinary South Africans.‖165 Indeed, the 
‗nation building‘ is an on-going and never-ending process in which the identities are being 
formed and re-formed at any time in any society, not only an emergency in post-crisis period.  
In terms of the historical truth, it must be noted that history as such does not form a part of 
individual‘s identity, memory does.166 But history influences memory, especially public 
collective memory, historical consciousness is an inevitable part of one‘s identity. Pakier and 
Stråth167 pose a question in this light about why, during the last fifteen years, have the 
references to the past been made ―in terms of memory rather than history‖ and point out that 
‗memory‘ as ―an elastic concept [...] has lost ever more precise meaning in proportion to its 
growing rhetorical power.‖ They argue that ―[t]he most common reasons for developing a 
usable past are related to individual and collective identity claims‖ and ―[a] sense of sameness 
over time and space is sustained by remembering.‖168  
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So they propose an answer: ―The conceptual slide from history to memory clearly relates to 
the question of legitimacy.‖ But the actors creating cohesion and political legitimacy, unlike 
in 19
th
 century, are not solely or even mainly historians anymore. ―In the wake of Foucault it 
is not only history but epistemological schemes in general that are deemed ideological and 
more or less political.‖169 They call this phenomenon a ‗democratising dimension‘ of the new 
conceptualisation of history which lessens the exclusive authority of professional historians 
and at the same time carries a ‗populist dimension‘ ―that runs the risk of manipulation and 
abuse – rather than use – of history.‖170 
Based on that and on the location of history rather (and growingly) on the side of art on the 
―science-art axis‖ because of its unavoidable using of moral interpretations and narration, 
Pakier and Stråth consider the collective identity nothing more than a social and cultural 
construct, stating that ―[i]ndividuals have memories but collectives have not, [a]s collective 
phenomena, memories are discourses based on processes of social work and social 
bargaining.‖171 History is a mediated past, simplified and often generalised. A historian and a 
former soldier in WW II, Reinhard Koselleck ―swore the right of the individual to his or her 
own inalienable memory as a part of human dignity‖ and talked about ―the veto right of 
personal experiences.‖172  
This is definitely one of the most difficult dilemmas also in the context of the right to 
historical truth about the crimes against humanity: so closely connected to human dignity, the 
right to the truth should somehow accommodate the account of rationalisation and 
individuality of history, as appositely uttered by Judith Miller: 
 ―Abstraction is memory‘s most ardent enemy. It kills, because it encourages distance, and often 
indifference. We must remind ourselves that the Holocaust was not six million. It was one plus one 
plus one. Only in understanding that civilized people must defend the one by one by one can the 
Holocaust, the incomprehensible, be given meaning.‖
173
 
For the purposes of this research, the collective memory is understood as a sum of individual 
memories but it is not fully separable from social-cultural phenomena and group-
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psychological processes that make collective memory a communal phenomenon.
174
 The 
memory politics, legislation and history as activities or narratives conducted, created or 
influenced by states shape them both, aiming at the influencing of individual identity in order 
to build the collective national identity and ‗come to terms with the past.‘175 History is 
distinguished from memory but in the context of this analysis mainly coincides with it 
because history as a carrier of evidence and facts about the past in its un-manipulated manner 
holds a value of its own, being an object of protection from populist abuse of it.
176
  
The relations between legal, social and historical Vergangenheitsbewältigung are well 
concluded by Caroline Fournet. She emphasises the importance of trials (or the absence of 
them) in shaping the memory because of the validity of the principle res judicata pro veritate 
habetur (what is tried must be considered as truth), i.e. the commission or omission of trials 
will be interpreted as truthful confirmation ―that there were no criminals to be tried‖ or ―that 
the crimes did happen and that the criminals deserved to be tried. This confirmation will 
remain in social memory as „the truth‟ and will thus participate in the collective recollection 
of past events.‖177 [emphasis added, M.R.] So, ultimately, ―with legal memory comes social 
memory and with social memory comes historical memory.‖178 
2.2. The Types of Historical Truth 
So, history as a discipline and subsequent narrative should be truthful, reflecting as much as 
possible history understood as a record of past events. What does that mean? Although the 
following discussion will focus on the right to truth outside the transitional period, I will 
borrow some terminology and concepts from the scholars of this area in order to determine 
the possible content of the historical truth in the context of human rights law and illustrate the 
complexity of the discussion about the truth.  
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In very wide terms it is possible to distinguish between forensic and narrative truth as argued 
by Richard A. Wilson in the context of South-Africa. For him forensic truth represents ―a 
legal and scientific notion of uncovered facts and corroborating evidence – […] investigations 
of the causes and patterns of violence as well as individual incidents of gross violations of 
human rights;‖ narrative truth includes three categories of ―personal, social, and healing or 
restorative truth‖, emphasising ―narrative, subjectivity, and the experiential dimensions of 
truth telling.‖179 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South-Africa itself was guided by 
four types of truth: ―factual or forensic truth; personal or narrative truth; social or ‗dialogue‘ 
truth (see below) and healing and restorative truth.‖180  
Juan Mendez proposes a distinction between structural (―establishes […] patterns of violence; 
the nature, scope, and methods of repression; and the responsibility for the planning and 
execution of this repression‖) and individualised (―provides details about individual 
disappearances, […] the exact circumstances, location, and fate of disappeared individuals‖) 
truth.
181
 Reflecting the other types, the couple of ―knowledge‖ and ―acknowledgment‖ clearly 
represents the different aims and effects of different types of truth which could be summarised 
in two main categories: forensic fact-revealing and personal healing of victims and 
survivors.
182
  
These two aims in my opinion vastly resemble the nature of history and historiography as 
opposed to memory. Using a description of a French historian Pierre Nora, very well 
summarised and quoted by Judith M. Panitch:  
―[M]emory, specifically collective memory, [i]s a sort of living heritage, the "unself-conscious, 
commanding, all powerful" repetition of tradition that links a society to its past. Opposed to memory is 
history, "which is how our hopelessly forgetful modern societies, propelled by change, organize the 
past .... [H]istory is a representation of the past," which attempts to analyze, totalize, and make sense 
of it.‖183 
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It is clear that all these aspects represented in different types of truth are important from the 
point of view of reconciliation and coming to terms with its past of the society. Both of the 
wide concepts (forensic and narrative) are viewable through human rights lenses in general. 
E.g. the freedom of expression concerns both, forensic and narrative truth: the widespread 
legislation on the denial of Holocaust in Europe prohibits the denial of facts but also 
revisionism and justifying of it;
184
 the court practice rather focuses on factual truth protection 
interpreting those provisions, distinguishing denial of ‗clearly established historical facts‘ 
from interpretation
185
 (protecting thereby foremost forensic truth).  
The wider purpose of that prohibition however is the protection and preservation of memory 
as such, the respect of the dignity of the victims, their heirs and prevention through promoting 
objective knowledge and understanding on the crux and functioning of the ‗regime of evil‘.186 
The prohibition of the hate speech does not make this distinction but bans any act inciting 
hatred and might often inter alia include the protection of truth.
187
  
Viewing through the lenses of the right to truth as an independent norm or principle of 
international human rights law, the discussion above leads to the conclusion that mainly the 
protection of forensic truth lays in the auspices of this right or principle. Only this type of 
truth, as argued by Richard A. Wilson in his book on South-African TRC, is an end in itself – 
―that end being the creation of knowledge about the past.‖ The narrative truth according to 
him ―is a means to a different end, such as healing or affirming the dignity of survivors.‖188  
Drawing from a notion of the intrinsic value of the truth in legal system and the purpose of 
dealing with history by state, it might be concluded that the narrative truth is protected under 
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the right to truth as much as it must be in compliance with the forensic truth. Paraphrasing 
Juan Mendez (cited above), the provision of the narrative truth for the society cannot ‗value 
lies over truth,‘ doing so the state would be ‗abusing – rather than using – history‘.  
Before moving to the more concrete legal perspective and expression of the right to the 
historical truth in peace-time context I will shortly describe the framework of the two dark 
historical inheritances of Europe: Holocaust and Communist crimes.  
2.3. Two Circles of ‘European Memory’: Holocaust and Gulag189 
―If legal memory remains absent, the emergence of social or collective memory will either 
prove impossible or will, at best, encounter serious obstacles and difficulties. […] The lack of 
trials or their clear shortcomings‖ cause a ―legal oblivion, soon followed by social and 
collective amnesia.‖190  
A good example of the impact of the lack of legal memory is the subject-handling of 
Communist crimes in Europe. Holocaust is the dark centre of European collective memory, 
―Europe‘s negative founding myth.‖191 This is not because German 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung has spread over Europe but because ―anti-Semitism and fascism 
were pan−European phenomena: the murder of the Jews would have been impossible without 
the broad collaboration of European governments and citizens.‖192 Claus Leggewie points out 
that ―[r]emembrance of the Holocaust has always possessed a contemporary, political-
pedagogic facet directed at the present and at the future: Theodor W. Adorno's famous plea 
was that the Holocaust be remembered so that "Auschwitz is not repeated."‖193 The 
Nuremberg trials and further legislation on the memory of Holocaust have well guaranteed the 
avoidance of the ‗legal oblivion‘ or ‗social and collective amnesia‘ about it in the whole 
Europe.  
The same does not apply for Communist crimes that took place in Europe in comparable or 
even bigger magnitude and cruelty before Holocaust, simultaneously with it and after that. 
This other circle of evil and inhumanity of Europe has found significantly less 
acknowledgment and investigation. Maria Mälksoo argues that ―the asymmetry in the 
remembering and research‖ on criminal record of the Soviet crimes in comparison to the Nazi 
crimes, besides Nazism being more immanent to the main history writers of Europe, ―could 
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also be attributable to the simple fact that there has never been a Soviet Nuremberg process of 
a sort which, after all, made technically possible the documentation of the crimes of Nazism 
in the first place.‖194 As a result ―the 20th-century history of Europe has arguably largely 
bypassed the Eastern European component, thus leading to a ‗one-legged, one-sided, one-
eyed‘ account of Europe‘s immediate past.‖195  
The memory of Communist crimes is however alive in the affected societies, the ‗social and 
collective amnesia‘ was, despite Soviet Union‘s forceful policy towards it, not fully achieved. 
With the collapse of the SU in the first place and after their accession to the EU and NATO 
later, the countries suffered under communist crimes (especially Baltic states and Poland) 
have started to bring their memory back in the picture (first in their own countries and later in 
the whole Europe).
196
 Besides the moral (and legal) claim that Europe has an obligation to 
remember and preserve history of all its parts in order not to lose its ―moral compass‖, these 
countries also insist on security claims, stating that ―the re-evaluation of the dark spots of 
history builds confidence and promotes cooperation among states.‖197  
From the point of view of the right to truth one has to agree with Claus Leggewie in that ―[i]f 
the denial of the Holocaust is punishable across much of Europe, then this logically enough 
encourages demands that the horrendous aspects of communism be dealt with in an equivalent 
manner.‖198 Thus, the former Estonian president Lennart Meri  
―remarked with some irony in the early 1990s that everybody was talking about the death of 
communism, yet no one had actually seen its body. The Polish and Baltic endeavours to seek 
international condemnation of the crimes of the communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe 
could be regarded as attempts to reify the very demise of communism, or, indeed, to disinter its 
‗body‘.‖199  
The ‗disintering of communism‘s body‘ and ‗reifying the very demise of communism‘ are 
visibly directed to the search for the historical truth. The question only remains, in what way 
should the right to truth in the current case be evoked and what would that entail? 
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2.4. The Right to the Truth and Memory Laws 
―[P]erhaps the "last victim of any genocide is truth."‖200  
As established above, the right to truth cannot be limited to transitional period, it would 
contradict the provision and idea of Rome Statute and Genocide Convention (as implicitly 
giving basis for the right to truth), the nature and character of the right to truth itself but also, 
as will be shown below, the underlying idea of human rights in general. This chapter attempts 
to analyse the expression of the right to truth in peace-time by providing some most 
noteworthy examples of legislation and court practice on memory and history in Europe, 
presenting and analysing the main philosophy and rationale behind the legislation on history 
from the foundational view-points of both – pro et contra – advocates.  
2.4.1. Balancing between ‘Duty to Remember’ and the Freedom of Expression 
The above-referred Principles of Impunity, under the right to know, establish the ‗duty to 
preserve memory‘ (principle 3):  
―A people‘s knowledge of the history of its oppression is part of its heritage and, as such, must be 
ensured by appropriate measures in fulfilment of the State‘s duty to preserve archives and other 
evidence concerning violations of human rights and humanitarian law and to facilitate knowledge of 
those violations. Such measures shall be aimed at preserving the collective memory from extivnction 
and, in particular, at guarding against the development of revisionist and negationist arguments.‖201 
[emphasis added, M.R.] 
This is also the reasoning behind and the spirit of the laws on the denial or minimisation of 
the Holocaust or other crimes against humanity (which will be elaborated below). In words of 
Caroline Fournet: ―Behind the expression ‗duty of remembrance‘, there is [...] a wider 
imperative: although it does obviously encompass the obligation to recall past occurrences of 
genocide, it in fact only acquires its full meaning if understood as also implying the obligation 
to use such recollection of the past to act both in the present and for the future.‖202  
There are very strong justifications for adopting the laws against genocide denial, all well 
reflecting the ‗duty to remember‘. An American genocide scholar Roger W. Smith:  
―Denial of well-documented genocides and of crimes against humanity is deeply offensive to 
survivors, their descendents, and all those who care about fellow humans without regard to ethnic, 
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racial, or religious identity. [...] [W]ith denial comes silence, and if individuals, groups, and states do 
not remember and do not resist denial, their inaction sends a signal that genocide and crimes against 
humanity can be committed with impunity. The lesson can be drawn: commit genocide and deny it. In 
due time, the world will forget it ever happened or set it aside out of expediency.‖203 
But there are also serious questions to be asked and carefully answered when deciding the 
adoption of such laws. Is that an effective method for reconciliation and tolerance? Might the 
law become not a solution but part of the problem itself, officialising one version of history 
and thereby provoking tensions? What are the global or international-political impacts of such 
moves? Roger W. Smith discusses the situation in the light of article 301 of Turkish Criminal 
Code that prohibits not denial but acknowledging of the Armenian genocide as ―insulting 
Tuskishness‖ which has actually been used to try people (including Nobel Prize winner Orhan 
Pamuk).
204
 This is a good example of law becoming a tool of politics and thereby also 
politicising history.  
That leads us to the central issue in the debate on memory laws: democratic freedoms (mainly 
the freedom of expression) and independency of professional history versus protection of 
public order and safety, the dignity of survivors, their heirs, and even the humanity in a 
society. Timothy Garton Ash, a British historian and political writer has initiated a website 
called Free Speech Debate run by Oxford graduate students in 13 languages aiming at 
promoting a debate on how the freedom of speech should be regulated. Principle 5 out of ten 
principles of free debate reads: ―We allow no taboos in the discussion and dissemination of 
knowledge.‖205 What about propaganda and deliberate falsehood, i.e. un-knowledge?  
An article by Josie Appleton on the same website well exemplifies the tensions and counter-
arguments for legal regulation of history. The article is based on an interview with a French 
historian Pierre Nora, a leading figure of the movement Liberté pour l´Histoire created as a 
reaction to a law adopted by French National Assembly obliging schools to teach about the 
positive impact of the French presence abroad, particularly in North Africa.
206
 The provision 
was abolished and simultaneously held process against a historian Olivier Pétré-Grenouilleau, 
who was accused of the ―‗denial of a crime against humanity‘, after he said in an interview 
that in his view the slave trade was ‗not a genocide‘ since ‗it didn‘t have the goal of 
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exterminating people,‘‖ withdrawn.207 Paradoxically, Olivier Pétré-Grenouilleau is a historian 
who has done a lot to disclose the history of slavery. In 2005 he received an award from a 
Senate for ―a historical work that meets scholarly standards and also contributes to the 
citizens‘ education.‖208 
As a result of the appeal by Liberté pour l´Histoire also the prohibition of the denial of 
Armenian genocide was declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Council, ―which 
found in a landmark decision on 28 February 2012 that the law was unconstitutional on the 
grounds of infringement on freedom of expression.‖209 Thus ―[a] 2008 parliamentary enquiry 
– at which Liberté Pour l‟Histoire gave the opening and closing testimonies – issued the 
resounding conclusion that government should refrain from legislating on history.‖210 The 
main slogan of the movement is ―liberty for history is liberty for all‖.211 
The case of Pétré-Grenouilleau represents an example how legislation can enable political 
struggles and interests of certain groups and seriously inhibit the independence of historians 
and freedom of expression in general.212 It is no wonder that his colleagues stood up in the 
protection of their whole profession and in this context it is not exaggerated to say that ―they 
acted in the name of the right of every citizen to have access to unbiased knowledge of 
history.‖213  
But do memory laws necessarily have to be in conflict with the freedom of history? Does this 
derive from the nature of those laws or is it rather a question of implementation of them? Is it 
possible to overcome the problem of lacking legal memory which, according to Fournet may 
cause ‗legal oblivion‘ and ‗collective social amnesia‘? What about the groups and individuals 
actually justified to receive reparation for injustices that took place maybe even centuries ago 
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(like the slavery cases in US
214)? What about the ‗common European memory‘ project and 
giving voice to sufferings of Eastern and Central Europeans, the victims of Communist 
crimes?  
Turning back to Hannah Arendt, memory laws may be justified if they embody the truth as 
‗the highest criterion,‘ fulfilling namely that task to restrict any political power-struggles in 
the field of history and memory, preventing also possible manipulation by historians 
themselves: historians, possessing professional credibility, have very strong position in 
falsifying any factual truth for political purposes (e.g. David Irving or Robert Faurisson
215
 
cases) and eventually ‗manipulate it out of the world‘. The ultimate purpose of the law in the 
field of history should be balancing and alleviating such risk by balancing the power of 
manipulation of opinions:  
―The chances of factual truth surviving the onslaught of power are very slim indeed; it is always in 
danger of being maneuvered out of the world not only for a time but, potentially, forever. Facts and 
events are infinitely more fragile things than axioms, discoveries, theories – even the most wildly 
speculative ones – produced by the human mind; they occur in the field of the ever-changing affairs of 
men, in whose flux there is nothing more permanent than the admittedly relative permanence of the 
human mind‘s structure. Once they are lost, no rational effort will ever bring them back.‖216 
[emphasis added, M.R.] 
Exactly the same presumption gives ground for historians to talk about the utmost importance 
of the ‗unbiased knowledge of history‘ and resist the post-modernism apologetics who 
suggest that history is mere literature, creating one of the many narratives and changing 
according to the present needs.
217
 ―My job as a historian is to present the truth,‖ one historian 
claims.
218
 ―The use of history lies in its capacity for advancing the approach to truth,‖ says the 
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other and continues: ―What is the truth? Mighty above all things, it resides in the small pieces 
which together form the record.‖219  
People can be deprived of truth by hiding it (which can also take legitimate forms falling 
under the scope of the right to information, like e.g. state secret in some circumstances). The 
unwelcome (historical) truth can definitely be hidden in totalitarian regimes – a good example 
is Soviet Union where some people and events threatening the power of Stalin or Communist 
party were simply ‗erased‘ from history, or Hitler‘s Germany. ―[I]t was more dangerous to 
talk about the concentration and extermination camps, whose existence was no secret, than to 
hold and utter ―heretical‖ views on anti-Semitism, racism and Communism.‖220 In free 
countries the problem is different, there ―unwelcome factual truths are tolerated‖ but ―they are 
often, consciously or unconsciously, transformed into opinions – as though the fact of 
Germany‘s support of Hitler or of France‘s collapse before the German armies in 1940 […] 
were not a matter of historical record but a matter of opinion.‖221 [emphasis added, M.R.] 
That does not mean that opinions must not be held but that deliberate lying with the aim of 
creating a ‗buyable good‘ on market of opinions should not be tolerated. People should be 
able to make their decisions and create opinions and thoughts on truthful information: 
―opinions, inspired by different interests and passions, can differ widely and still be legitimate 
as long as they respect factual truth.‖222 Moreover, the freedom of opinion should not be 
opposed to the protection of truth, as it would be ―a farce unless factual information is 
guaranteed and the facts themselves are not in dispute.‖223 In the context of history writing, 
Arendt argues that even when we agree that ―every generation has the right to write its own 
history,‖224 we mean the right to rearrange the facts deriving from its own perspective, not 
―the right to touch the factual matter itself.‖225  
So, the circumvention of the lack of knowledge, manipulation of it and obliviousness is the 
common aim of both – wide freedom of expression and memory laws. To quote Arendt once 
again:  
―Since such factual truths concern issues of immediate political relevance, there is more at stake here 
than the perhaps inevitable tension between two ways of life within the framework of a common and 
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commonly recognized reality. What is at stake here is this common and factual reality itself.‖226 
[emphasis added, M.R.]  
Is politics then a common enemy to both? Not necessarily and not entirely.  
John Torpey makes an argument that acknowledgment of the corporate responsibility, the 
continuity of corporate bodies, such as nations, enables to come to terms with the past.
 227
 
―[T]he pre-occupation with past crimes and atrocities […] promotes attention to once 
neglected suffering of victims and bears witnesses to an enhancement of their status vis-á-vis 
the perpetrators,‖ sharply questioning the idea of Thucydides in ―Melian Dialogue‖ that ―the 
standard of justice depends on the equality of power … [;] the strong do what they have the 
power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept.‖228  
The idea of law, and especially human rights, is namely to set limits for such arbitrary power-
politics. As Torpey notes, the Wiedergutmachung is ―an essential complement to the spread of 
human rights ideas,‖ helping ―to make the notion of human rights seem real and enforceable 
in the absence of a global police force empowered to back rights claims with armed might.‖229 
Reparation-claims are many-fold but they all assume dealing with history, they assume legal 
memory, disclosing of facts, understanding of causal relations etc. And again, collective 
reparations, acknowledgement needed thereto, cannot be narrowed down solely to courts, to 
trials, either civil or criminal, without them becoming ‗show trials‘ and without making law a 
tool of popular history education or ‗expressivist‘ Messiah. So the law needs to deal with 
history and so does politics. A legislator has to create an environment allowing individual 
claims in concrete areas but also provide societal equality and justice without it. Through the 
protection of historical truth, memory laws can fulfil these tasks.  
It might be said that legal and political dealing with the past is needed to avoid malicious 
manipulation of public memory and identity, to promote justice and equality by forbidding the 
falsification and manipulation of truth. No-one is opposing the ‗democratising‘ tendency of 
history and memory: the aim of both of the sides is to enable people make use of the 
knowledge, to understand the past and each-other, to act for a better future. ‗Coming to terms‘ 
means reconciliation and peaceful coexistence not just in history seminars among 
professionals and parliamentary commissions but among ‗ordinary‘ people. The French 
historian Réné Rémond, one of the signatories of the discussed appeal, explains: 
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―[H]istorians do not claim a monopoly on the past: they simply possess professional competence. […] 
In protesting against the principle underlying these historical memory laws, historians remind us of the 
need to respect the differences between roles and spheres, even as they reaffirm that the domain of 
history, the guardian of our collective memory of the past, belongs to everyone.‖230  
So, the question is about balance and concrete ways, the concrete content of a concrete law 
and its implementation. ―The scholarly pursuit of the past can be political, and hence 
contribute to revealing the subterranean aspects of the past, but it fails if it becomes 
politicized, subservient to narrowly political interests.‖231 Law, as argued above, should be 
one of the a-political ‗civilisers‘ carrying the value of truth and truthfulness as its highest 
criterion, thereby walking hand in hand with scholarship. The principle of the right to truth 
draws a connecting line.  
2.4.2. The Memory Laws and Court Practice in Europe 
The conclusion to be made based on the previous discussion is that memory laws might be 
legitimate means in case they protect the factual truth or other human rights through that. I 
will now turn to elaborate the memory laws in Europe on the example of Framework Decision 
on Combating Certain Forms and Expressions of Racism and Xenophobia by Means of 
Criminal Law of the EU and have an insight into how courts, especially ECtHR have 
implemented and interpreted respective provisions of national laws.  
2.4.2.1. European Memory Laws – the Scope and Purpose 
The Framework Decision is not foremost aimed at protecting the historical truth. As the name 
says, its purpose is ―combating racist and xenophobic offences […], by promoting a full and 
effective judicial cooperation between Member States.‖232 However, it entails article 1 (1) (c) 
and (d), which state that all the member states should incriminate the following activities:  
―publicly condoning, denying or grossly trivialising crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and 
war crimes as defined in Articles 6, 7 and 8 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court 
(hereinafter ‗ICC‘); or the crimes defined in Article 6 of the Charter of the International Military 
Tribunal appended to the London Agreement of 8 August 1945, when the conduct is carried out in a 
manner likely to incite violence or hatred against such a group or one or more of its members.‖233 
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The respective legislation of member states was supposed to be in compliance with the 
Framework Decision by 28 November 2010.
234
 In 2014 the European Commission published 
a report on the results.
235
 Concerning genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes as 
defined in articles 6, 7 and 8 of the Rome Statute, altogether fifteen states incriminate denial, 
condoning or trivializing those crimes.
236
 Thirteen member states ―have no criminal-law 
provisions governing this conduct,‖ whereas, importantly, ―Germany and Netherlands state 
that national case law applicable to Holocaust denial and/or trivialisation would also apply to 
the conduct covered by this article.‖237  
Concerning crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes as defined in article 
6 of the Charter of Nuremberg tribunal, the denial of Holocaust is prohibited and criminally 
sanctioned in altogether twelve European countries.
238
 Six countries ―make reference to the 
National Socialist regime or Nazi Germany as the relevant perpetrators of these crimes.‖239 
Interestingly, ―Lithuania and Poland limit the incrimination by referring to crimes committed 
by the National Socialist regime against the Lithuanian or Polish nation or citizens, 
respectively, with Poland making reference only to denial in this respect.‖240  
Fifteen countries ―have no specific provisions criminalising this form of conduct‖ but 
―Netherlands, Finland and UK have submitted sentencing rulings for trivialisation, condoning 
and denial of the Holocaust, based on criminal-law provisions punishing respectively 
incitement, ethnic agitation or stirring up of hatred.‖241 
There is a big number of countries who have adopted specific legislation against the denial of 
certain crimes against humanity but also a number of states who consider legislation on 
different forms of the incitement of hatred and violence sufficient to deal with the issue. 
Majority of the European countries do not mention Communist crimes explicitly, significant 
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exceptions are Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary and Lithuania.
242
 Anyway, the definitions 
given in the Framework Decision, referring to crimes against humanity and war crimes as 
defined in the Rome Statute and London Agreement should include the Communist crimes. 
That assumption has found confirmation also in the case-law of ECtHR in the ruling of the 
Grand Chamber in Kononov vs. Latvia, where the court held that the standard of Nuremberg 
Tribunals is universal and ―in terms of war crimes, the winners of World War II can be 
measured by the same normative yardstick that they were themselves instrumental in 
establishing.‖243 The establishment of Communist crimes in legal memory has not met further 
success however.  
An American scholar Laurent Pech, criticising the Framework Decision, argues that there is a 
lack of universal consensus on the ―question of whether genocide-denial must be criminally 
prohibited […], [w]while ―hate speech‖ has long been outlawed on the basis of specific 
provisions contained in several international instruments.‖244 Indeed, adding those provisions 
in the document the aim of which is fighting racism and xenophobia, shows, in line with the 
argumentation on the role of memory laws above, the need to protect certain historical truth as 
a value on its own, and/or that denial or trivialisation of those crimes is considered an act of 
incitement of hatred. Differently from inciting hatred or violence, where the malicious intent 
derives from the very notion and definition of the act, in case of denying (or condoning or 
trivialising) historical facts, it is assumable (as will be discussed below) but not a necessary 
component by the definition of the respective provision (paragraph 2 of the same article 
allows states to add that clause optionally). Therefore it is assumable that the first aim is very 
strong or even prevalent in the Framework Decision.  
The minutes from the adoption of the decision declare that it  
―is limited to crimes committed on the grounds of race, colour, religion, descent or national or ethnic 
origin. It does not cover crimes committed on other grounds, e.g. by totalitarian regimes. However, the 
Council deplores all of these crimes.‖245  
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Communist crimes were, according to a most common understanding
246
, directed to the 
destruction of a political group – Kulaks or borjois – clearly excluded from the binding legal 
scope of the decision, although the Council ‗deplores them‘.  
In 2010 the proposal of Eastern European countries to introduce a so-called ―double 
genocide‖ into EU law, to treat the Communist crimes ―according to the same standards as 
those of Nazi regimes, notably in those countries with Holocaust denial laws‖ was rejected by 
the Commission because there is no consensus on the question: ―[a]t this stage, the conditions 
to make a legislative proposal have not been met. The commission will continue to keep this 
matter under review.‖247 If conditions for this legislative proposal have not yet been met, 
neither should they be for the other ‗circle‘ of European memory. The real reasons are much 
more likely political: the attempt to bring Communist crimes into the legal memory is taken 
as ―a thinly-veiled attempt at rehabilitation of domestic collaborators while antisemitism 
remains a live issue on the streets and in the media in the east‖248 or ―political relativism, 
threatening to ―dilute the unique nature of the Nazi crimes.‖‖249  
The exclusion of acts of the same category for a reason that they took place on different 
grounds does not seem plausible in the light of the aims of the provision. According to 
Carolin Fournet the denial of genocide is a genocidal act in itself, continuing the genocide:  
―Genocide denial is a manipulation of truth, it is a lie aimed at destroying more thoroughly the 
targeted group and at allowing for one particular instance of genocide to continue while opening the 
door for other genocides, against the same group or against other groups, to be committed.‖250  
She logically emphasises that international regulation on the denial is needed ―also because it 
has to be acknowledged that denial concerns all cases of genocides, and not only the 
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Shoah.‖251 I see no reason why the same should not be valid concerning the crimes against 
humanity.  
So, the Framework Decision is not protecting the ‗fragile factual truth‘ from ‗manipulation 
out of the world‘ for eternity. The legal memory supporting social one in the Decision does 
not guarantee the availability of objective knowledge about the past but only part of it. It 
realises the risk of sending a message that other genocides or crimes against humanity do not 
count as such, basically legitimising them and thereby also facilitating the oblivion in 
collective memory, distorting historical truth and imposing one historical picture being 
thereby a political tool not a ‗gentle civiliser,‘ thereby also failing in preventive effect.   
However, the memory laws in nation states have been adopted and applied independently 
from the Framework Decision. I will further have a look how they have been implemented by 
the ECtHR and some of the national courts. 
2.4.2.2. Memory Laws in Court Practice 
On an example of three big countries in Europe with long existence of denial-laws: Germany, 
France and Spain,
252
 three main argumentations justifying the existence of such regulation in 
the light of freedom of speech (that is considered as an ultimate value and one of the pre-
requisites for a democratic society) may be brought out:  
a) The distinction between opinions and factual utterances: ―a value judgement contributes to 
the intellectual battle between opinions on a question on public interest‖ and should be 
favoured by the courts, whereas ―the dissemination of a factual statement that the speaker 
knows to be false or when the speaker relies on a fact that has been proven to be false,‖ on 
the contrary, does not fall under the protection of the freedom of speech.
253
 Holocaust 
deniers are considered to ―offer factual assertions whose notoriously untrue nature has 
been established beyond any doubt thanks to countless testimonies of eye-witnesses and 
documents, the evidence collected in numerous previous criminal proceedings and the 
findings of historical scholarship.‖254 (Germany) 
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b) ―[T]he denial of Holocaust constitutes an abusive use of freedom of expression.‖255 It is 
necessary to protect constitutional order, dignity and memory of the victims. (France) 
c) Although Spanish constitutional order is, according to the Constitutional Court based on 
human dignity, the Section 607 (2) of the Criminal Code, which is a provision of 
―international origin,‖ is not compatible with the freedom of expression and therefore it is 
not tolerable that ―the mere transmission of ideas to be classified as a crime, not even in 
cases where those ideas are truly execrable, being contrary to human dignity.‖256 
Therefore denying as a non-dangerous act is not forbidden whereas justifying is.
257
 
(Spain) 
The idea of the right to truth seems most clearly reflected in the German approach. However, 
the objective knowledge, i.e. the right to truth is actually needed in all the circumstances. The 
protection of human dignity involves the protection of the memory of the victims and thereby 
the factual truth, the purposes of protecting the public order, peace and everyone‘s rights 
involves an element of the prevention of the crimes in question. It was already argued above 
that knowledge must be available for the prevention. In case of such complex issues, 
involving the very human existence and all the underlying values of it, the availability of such 
knowledge, the seeking for the truth about it must be especially cautiously guaranteed, taking 
thus into account that the painfulness and feeling of embarrassment makes the truth about 
these crimes particularly fragile.  
The argumentation of the Spanish court is definitely acceptable from the point of view of the 
freedom of expression. But allowing the denial as ‗non-harmful‘, unless ―expressed with the 
intentional objective of inciting to racial discrimination or hatred, pose a real risk to the 
pacific coexistence among citizenry or violate dignity of persons,‖258 might reduce the means 
for prevention to zero: by the time the case gets to the court, the harm is already done. It 
should be logically not necessary to wait for the genocide to occur, in order to stop it. It is 
proper to remind here the point made by Koskenniemi that the intent in such cases is 
extremely hard to determine as even the ‗empires of evil‘ of Stalin and Hitler were allegedly 
based on good intentions. Thus, as the dissenting judges, justifying the legitimacy of the 
repealed provision, noted, ―past tragic historical experiences in Europe demonstrate that 
genocide deniers are motivated by antidemocratic as well as racist intent; finally, there is a 
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clear causal link between the denial of past genocides and the present commission of racist 
acts of violence.‖259  
As for the ECtHR, it should first be clarified that the freedom of expression is of very high 
value, a landmark case in this field, Handyside vs. UK sets a standard: 
―Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of such a society, one of the basic 
conditions for its progress and for the development of every man. Subject to paragraph 2 of Article 10 
(art. 10-2), it is applicable not only to "information" or "ideas" that are favourably received or regarded 
as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb the State or 
any sector of the population. Such are the demands of that pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness 
without which there is no "democratic society".‖260   
In that light the approach to Holocaust denial cases has gone through a twofold approach
261
: 
(a) assessing the legitimacy of the prohibition or other measures taken through a concept of 
margin of appreciation and paragraph 2 of article 10 that sets out that every limitation to the 
freedom of expression shall be ―prescribed by law‖, have a ―legitimate objective‖ and be 
―necessary in a democratic society‖262; and (b) being regarded as an abuse of rights under 
article 17 which strips the activity of any protection of the ECHR.
263
 The former approach 
gave a wide margin of appreciation to the nation states in deciding on sensitive issues, 
considering the Holocaust-denial legislations and implementation of them mostly ‗necessary 
in a democratic society.‘264 The latter approach that has prevailed is more relevant for this 
research. I will bring out a few most important cases.  
The first case where the court took a stance that the denial of Holocaust is ‗an abuse of rights‘ 
and Holocaust was a ―clearly established historical fact‖ was Lehideux and Isorni vs France:  
―The Court considers that it is not its task to settle this point, which is part of an ongoing debate 
among historians about the events in question and their interpretation. As such, it does not belong to 
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the category of clearly established historical facts – such as the Holocaust – whose negation or 
revision would be removed from the protection of Article 10 by Article 17.‖265 [emphasis added, M.R.] 
The approach was implemented in Garaudy vs France, where the applicant was found to have 
ceased his rights under the ECHR:  
―The book which gave rise to the applicant's criminal convictions analyses in detail a number of 
historical events relating to the Second World War, such as the persecution of the Jews by the Nazi 
regime, the Holocaust and the Nuremberg Trials. Relying on numerous quotations and references, the 
applicant questions the reality, extent and seriousness of these historical events that are not the 
subject of debate between historians, but – on the contrary – are clearly established. […] There can be 
no doubt that denying the reality of clearly established historical facts, such as the Holocaust, [...] 
does not constitute historical research akin to a quest for the truth. The aim and the result of that 
approach are completely different, the real purpose being to rehabilitate the National-Socialist regime 
and, as a consequence, accuse the victims themselves of falsifying history.‖266 [emphasis added, M.R.] 
Furthermore, the Court continues:  
―[...]Denying crimes against humanity is therefore one of the most serious forms of racial defamation 
of Jews and of incitement to hatred of them. The denial or rewriting of this type of historical fact 
undermines the values on which the fight against racism and anti-Semitism are based and constitutes a 
serious threat to public order. Such acts are incompatible with democracy and human rights because 
they infringe the rights of others.‖267 
The court was unanimous in declaring the application for these reasons inadmissible. The 
prohibition of denial of ‗clearly established historical facts‘ about crimes against humanity 
constitutes in itself a protection of factual truth (which the victims of crimes against humanity 
have a right to claim in the court). The court has repeatedly given such interpretation. 
Moreover, in Lehideux and Isorni, one of the reasons, why the court concluded that there had 
been a violation of the freedom of expression of the applicants, was the need to deal with a 
past in even if it is  
―likely to reopen the controversy and bring back memories of past sufferings, the lapse of time makes 
it inappropriate to deal with such remarks, forty years on, with the same severity as ten or twenty years 
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previously. That forms part of the efforts that every country must make to debate its own history 
openly and dispassionately.‖268 [emphasis added, M.R.]  
It is also clear from the decisions that a state has a positive obligation to protect this right by 
legal and judicial means. 
The Reseach Division of ECtHR, based on this and similar case-law, has concluded that ―it is 
an integral part of freedom of expression […] to seek historical truth.‖269 It is important to 
notice at this point that ECtHR has made decisions deriving from the same principle also on 
issues not dealing with Holocaust and Nazi crimes. For example, the court held that it was an 
infringement of the freedom of expression when a journalist, who was writing about the 
massive killings of Armenians by Turkish in 1915 and concluded that these acts constituted 
genocide, was convicted for ―denigrating ‗Turkishness;‘‖ the court stated inter alia: ―In such 
societies, the debate surrounding historical events of a particularly serious nature should be 
able to take place freely, and it was an integral part of freedom of expression to seek historical 
truth.‖270  
Thus, the court has, in all the cases concerning the ‗clearly established historical facts‘, 
although in the context of Holocaust used a phrase ‗such as Holocaust‘. That means that 
Holocaust is just one and maybe currently the most prominent example but it is not the only 
one. Rather, in line with the argumentation of Torpey, the asymmetry towards remembering 
and recognising Holocaust is used as a paradigmatic case also for other comparable past 
crimes, like in a precedential decision Kononov vs. Latvia, discussed above.  
The ECtHR, mostly reflecting the German courts‘ approach towards denial- laws in relation 
to the freedom of expression, might be said to be implicitly but consistently applying the 
general principle of the right to truth. As Fournet argues about the practice of French courts:    
―[A] close reading of the rulings […] regarding genocide denial shows that, far from being willing to 
impose a particular historical truth, […] courts sanction the confusion between historical knowledge 
and a messianic, propagandist discourse. In other words, […] courts do not impose a particular truth or 
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a particular vision of the truth but they do impose on historians ‗obligations of prudence, objective 
caution and intellectual neutrality‘‖271 
2.5. Conclusion 
As concluded in the Study on the Right to Truth, the right to the truth applies ―in all situations 
of serious violations of human rights,‖ and its material scope gives the right ―to seek and 
obtain information‖ on mainly such elements:  
―the causes leading to the person‘s victimization; the causes and conditions pertaining to the gross 
violations of international human rights law and serious violations of international humanitarian law; 
the progress and results of the investigation; the circumstances and reasons for the perpetration of 
crimes under international law and gross human rights violations; the circumstances in which 
violations took place; in the event of death, missing or enforced disappearance, the fate and 
whereabouts of the victims; and the identity of perpetrators.‖272 
The right to truth is not limited to the period of transition. It is substantiated by the nature of 
the acts having no ‗statute of limitation‘ giving rise to the right to truth but also by very 
practical reasons. Conclusively, it might be said that the right to objective knowledge about 
one‘s history belongs to every human being. It is possible to distinguish two ways of 
application of the right to truth:  
a) in an aftermath of a conflict or other grave violation of human rights in concrete cases for 
concrete victims or society, the right to truth applies as a norm of customary international 
law with very concrete content and application area.  
b) in peace-time, the right to truth serves as substance outside of political sphere, controlling 
and setting limits to the political persuasion, regulating the ‗market of opinions‘ so that 
that factual truth is not manipulated out but remains a metaphysical basis for the opinions, 
i.e. applies as a general principle of international human rights law.  
In peace-time, the truth about the events in question is regarded as historical truth and the 
right to truth, besides still actual principles of impunity and effective remedy, is mainly 
connected to freedom of expression, especially the freedom to seek and impart information; 
the protection of life, health and human dignity through fighting hate-crimes; protecting the 
memories and dignity of the victims and their heirs; and prevention of re-occurrence of past 
atrocities.  In this context,  
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―[t]he debate addresses the epistemological problem of finding truth in history and also the role 
government should play, the division of responsibilities between the legislature and the historian, the 
role of law, and access for all to objective knowledge of the past, which concerns nothing less than the 
theory and practice of democracy.‖273 [emphasis added, M.R.] 
The historical awareness, also called ―self-awareness and capacity to control our lives places 
historical knowledge at the center of our moral and political concerns.‖274 The central realm in 
these dynamics is the historical truth that forms a centre of the right to truth, setting limits to 
state‘s activities during nation building and bringing thereby certain positive and negative 
obligations under human rights law.  
The main negative obligations, based on the discussion above, could be considered: not 
restricting the freedom of expression and information, letting historians and public at large 
freely seek for the truth by allowing access to the state-held information, public debates, 
plurality of opinions; not imposing one historical picture as official state-approved history; 
not in any way distorting historical record (i.e. the facts about the past) when creating a 
narrative meant to form the national identity and collective memory; not excluding any group 
of society from the nation building process; allowing high academic freedom for historians.  
The main positive obligations could be considered: creating an environment, including 
legislation and administrative measures, allowing dealing ‗with its own history openly and 
dispassionately‘ (e.g. laws against racism and xenophobia, on academic independency of 
historians, on information-requests and access etc.); creating, sustaining and constant 
improving of archives and allowing wide public access to them; investigating past crimes and 
punishing the perpetrators through criminal proceedings; putting an effort in collecting new 
knowledge, exploring facts and making the results available for the society.  
The right to truth does not concern the legal nature and classification of (f)acts. So the 
prohibition of the denial of communist crimes by criminal law does definitely not derive from 
the right to truth. What derives from the right to truth is the right of the society (in whichever 
geographic or national boundaries) and every single person to know the factual truth about 
past crimes. So, the impact of legal, political or historical activity on the availability of truth 
and objective knowledge about the past falls under its scope. 
In large, memory laws are justified as ‗gentle civilizers‘ of power-politics if they are aimed at 
protecting the historical truth from being ‗maneuvered out of the world,‘ protecting thereby 
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the dignity and rights of the victims, their heirs and the whole society, including the 
prevention of repetition of past wrongs. On the contrary, the law has become a tool of politics 
and is not justified if it, instead of protecting factual truth, imposes one historical picture, 
using the power of legal memory to influence the social and individual. This is the principal 
threshold of the right to truth as a general principle of international law.  
Despite declarative recognitions of Communist crimes on political level, on legal level one 
side of the European memory is clearly dominant, holding Holocaust and regretting the Nazi 
past as ―the hegemonic mnemonic narrative‖275 of common memory and harmonious 
coexistence of Europe. The criminalisation of one event and excluding another from the scope 
of the legal regulation creates legal memory that determines which events are being 
investigated, publicly discussed and consequently the availability of truth and objective 
knowledge about the past events. For the reasons discussed above, it might be said that the 
Framework Decision contradicts the principle of the right to truth: besides distorting the 
factual truth, it also infringes the individual side of the truth, the dignity of memory and the 
‗duty to remember‘ of the one plus one plus one of the many millions of victims of 
Communist crimes.  
The central intuitive idea in European memory-politics appears to be the one expressed by 
Nazi-hunter Efraim Zuroff: ―For all the terrible crimes of the USSR, you can't compare the 
people who built Auschwitz with the people who liberated it.‖276 There is at least one country 
holds the same assumption as a basis for its national identity. The next and last chapter 
explores whether the upholding of such, from one perspective truthful assumption, causes the 
distortion of factual reality in Russian memory politics or is the nation building there 
conducted in accordance with the right to truth.  
3. Russia – heroism re-introduced (or still there)? 
It is no secret that the very same period when the Communist crimes against humanity were 
committed was also a period of glory and most heroic acts in winning the WW II in Russian 
history. It is also no secret that Russia has been reluctant in acknowledging the darker side of 
its past, e.g. the Kononov vs. Latvia judgement was heavily criticised by Russia. The decision 
was called a ―very dangerous precedent‖ that ―seek[s] to revise the outcome of World War II 
and whitewash the Nazis and their accomplices‖ and ―may be viewed as an attempt to draw 
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new dividing lines in Europe and to destroy the continent‘s emerging consensus on pan-
European standards and values.‖277  
I will discuss the creation of collective public memory in Russia today to see whether the 
provision of historical narrative does sufficiently reflect ‗factual truth‘ or is it rather 
implementing the ―politics of forgetting‖ like the totalitarian SU, i.e. those facts not 
favourable to the official ideology are simply ―airbrushed out of photographs, […] excised 
from encyclopaedias and history books, as if they had never existed.‖278 And eventually, 
answer the question: does Russia violate the right to truth in the process of nation building? 
I will not deal with all the historical consciousness and record but, in line with the previous 
discussion, only with the part concerning Nazi and Communist crimes against humanity. I 
will present the general moods and tendencies forming the background and basis for memory 
politics and discuss two main areas in this context: memory laws and history education. For 
the latter I will have a look at one of the state approved history textbooks for 9
th
 grade, 
choosing the one that has been re-printed and revised several times and is widely used. Two 
Russian history educators whom I have asked say that they use namely this author‘s book 
because it is ―the most honest about repressions,‖ as one of them put it. I will also analyse the 
conception underlying the course on the same topic for 11
th
 grade – ―Russian history 1900-
1945.‖  
3.1. Building New National Identity: Phoenix Rising from the Dust 
In 1990s, after the collapse of the SU, in all countries concerned, a process of creation (or re-
creation) of national identity took place – so in Russia. What makes Russia special in 
comparison to other post-Soviet countries is that all the other countries had something 
unifying to build their new identity upon (in addition to national culture, history and 
traditions) – mainly common suffering and the struggle for independence. For Russia the end 
of the SU also meant loss its ‗glory‘ and status of an empire. Similarly to Germany as a 
successor of Third Reich, Russia as a successor of the SU was (and still is in many peoples‘ 
mind) perceived as a ‗perpetrator state‘, bearing the responsibility for embarrassing inhuman 
past. That it is not an easy base to build a common identity upon.  
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Differently from Germany, Russia has never been apologetic, ―the official Russian line denies 
the equivalence of Stalin and Hitler.‖279 The collective national identity of Russia has in major 
part always contained a question about Russia‘s (power) position in world-politics, especially 
in Europe. Throughout history Russia has sought its place, at some times declaring itself 
belonging to Europe (a member of a family of civilised nations or democratic countries), at 
some times talking about being very different (Eurasia concept, directed democracy idea), but 
in any case the patriotism and importance of being powerful, accepted and respected has been 
the central issue (imperialism, unifier and leader of Christian countries concept). Pointing out 
Russia‘s shortcomings has almost always been something that hurts Russia‘s stateliness 
because, as mentioned, Russia has always aimed to be taken grandeur
280
. It might be not too 
much to say that neo-imperialist ideology has settled itself as a part of Russian foreign 
policy
281
 – making therefore the process of ‗internal legitimatisation‘ of state‘s international 
behaviour especially crucial from the standpoint of peace, security and human rights on global 
level. 
On 25 March 2014 at a ceremony presenting prizes for young cultural figures Vladimir Putin 
stated: ―In Russian society, it is necessary to form the kind of culture and values which could 
buttress our history and traditions, unite times and generations and allow for the consolidation 
of the nation.‖282 He was announcing the formulation of a report ―Foundations of State 
Cultural Politics‖ which calls for the protection of ―traditional Russian values,‖ according to 
the presidential advisor Vladimir Tolstoi, its main findings could be summarized as: ―Russia 
is not Europe.‖283 
I will bring some abstracts from the speech of Mr. Putin in September 2013, exemplifying the 
general idea and tendencies underlying not only inner but also foreign policies and goals of 
Russia:  
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―It is evident that it is impossible to move forward without spiritual, cultural and national self-
determination. […] For all the differences in our views, debates about identity and about our national 
future are impossible unless their participants are patriotic. Of course I mean patriotism in the purest 
sense of the word. […] Too often in our nation's history, instead of opposition to the government we 
have been faced with opponents of Russia itself. […] It's time to stop only taking note of the bad in 
our history, and berating ourselves more than even our opponents would do. [Self-]criticism is 
necessary, but without a sense of self-worth, or love for our Fatherland, such criticism becomes 
humiliating and counterproductive.‖284  
In 2012, the New York Times wrote:  
―The pro-Western, modernizing doctrine of President Dmitri A. Medvedev has been replaced by talk 
about ―post-democracy‖ and imperial nostalgia. One of the few clear strategies to emerge in recent 
months is an effort to mobilize conservative elements in society. Cossack militias are being revived, 
regional officials are scrambling to present ―patriotic education‖ programs and Slavophile discussion 
clubs have opened in major cities under the slogan ―Give us a national idea!‖―285 
Carnegie Endowment led opinion poll in Russia in 2012 showed that popularity of Stalin has 
grown from 12% in 1989 to 42% in 2012 – this is the percentage of people that ―named Stalin 
as the most influential historical figure.‖286 Putin has restored many of the Soviet symbols, 
like flag and anthem, which most of the Russian people feel proud of – 66% and 65% 
respectively (according to the poll in 2005).
287
 According to the same poll, however, only 4% 
of people know the lyrics of the anthem by heart and 60% of the people feel proud of the coat 
of arms Russia, about which there is also the widest knowledge – 83%.288  
To bring some examples from everyday life, in Moscow subway an old Soviet national 
anthem lyrics praising Stalin were restored as part of its interior decoration; the city of 
Volgograd issued a decree in the beginning of last year stating that the city should be renamed 
back to Stalingrad as it was before 1961 for ―commemorating the historic WWII battle;‖ 
several local authorities ―ordered images of Stalin to be put on city buses as part of 
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festivities;‖289 the pro-Kremlin youth organization Nashi (that calls itself anti-Fascist) claims 
that the falsification of history is the biggest threat for Russia today, against which they have 
organised several activities, e.g. the protest in front of Estonian embassy because of the 
replacement of a war remembrance statue in Tallinn or a project where SU veterans of World 
War II told their history.
290
 
How does the legacy of massive terror of Communist regime fit into the historic narrative of 
the new national idea? According to Russian sociologist Lev Gudkov, one of the authors of 
the Carnegie opinion poll, it does not:  
―Vladimir Putin's Russia of 2012 needs symbols of authority and national strength, however 
controversial they may be, to validate the newly authoritarian political order. […] Stalin, a despotic 
leader responsible for mass bloodshed but also still identified with wartime victory and national unity, 
fits this need for symbols that reinforce the current political ideology.‖291  
Putin is, according to Kremlin‘s critics by focusing ―on the nation's Soviet-era achievements 
rather than Stalinist crimes,‖ whitewashing the image of Stalin.292 Opposite to the ‗chaos‘ of 
1990‘s, when it was hoped that ―a new national ideology, a development ideology, would 
simply appear by itself,‖ Putin is bringing an order and united vision that derives from the 
positive approach to history:  
―We must be proud of our history, and we have things to be proud of. Our entire, uncensored history 
must be a part of Russian identity. Without recognising this it is impossible to establish mutual trust 
and allow society to move forward.‖293  
Liñán describes the process as a ―propaganda discourse that rather than shedding light on the 
past, accuses those who question Russia‘s greatness of lying.‖294 In short term, he admits, the 
aggressive propaganda has proved to be beneficial for Putin‘s political purposes but in the 
long run, he believes, ―it will become tiresome and come against stubborn reality.‖295 This 
conclusion vibrantly resembles Arendt‘s idea of substituting the whole factual reality by 
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manipulating factual truth out of the world. Let us further see, how much does the ‗stubborn 
reality‘ have chance to persist in this process.  
3.1. New Old Enemies 
The 20
th
 century crimes against humanity on the EU-level have been dealt with in the 
Framework Decision, in the context of fighting racism and xenophobia. The search for 
national identity under Putin‘s leadership aims at ―rebuilding of Russia‘s ties with its history‖ 
because, as Russian political scientist Sergei Karaganov puts it, ―[o]ur country was formed 
around defense, and all of a sudden there is no threat.‖296 
In the light of the abovementioned UN expert report on minority rights the recommendations 
of the monitoring body of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities (hereinafter FCNM) of the Council of Europe on the minority rights in Russia in 
2013 gives an impression that national minorities could be regarded as a new ‗threat‘. All the 
recommendations for ‗immediate action‘ carry more or less the following spirit:  
―Take more targeted measures to prevent, investigate, prosecute and sanction effectively all instances 
of racially motivated offences; condemn firmly all expressions of intolerance, racism and xenophobia, 
particularly in politics and in the media; redouble efforts to combat the dissemination of racist 
ideologies in the population, particularly among young people.‖ 297 [emphasis added, M.R] 
It would not be a big surprise regarding the ‗disobedient‘ minorities, like for example 
Chechens and other Caucasus peoples.
298
 But, as the Report brings out under the section of 
‗concerns‘, ―the number of racially-motivated offences remains alarming,‖ targeting not only 
persons from ―Central Asia, the Caucasus, Asia and Africa‖ but also Roma.299 The 
―expressions of Islamophobia and anti-Semitism‖ that are according to the Report ―frequently 
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reported‖, ―instances of interethnic clashes,‖ are ―sometimes fuelled by local politicians and 
the media. There is an increasing use of xenophobic and racist rhetoric by some politicians 
and the reaction of the authorities to racist statements has not always been adequate.‖300 
Furthermore, according to the Report ―media disseminates prejudice, sometimes hate speech, 
regarding some minority groups, […]‖ like the ones named above.301 Drawing from the recent 
events in Ukraine and the aggressive propaganda carried out by Russian state controlled 
media-channels
302
, it might be claimed that also nations outside Russia (foremost the majority 
nations of the countries of the former Soviet Union) are projected as enemies, thereby 
justifying Russia‘s acts of aggression in these territories.303  
The old enemy – West, especially US, is also still on the picture. This finds confirmation in 
the latest Russian official foreign-political documents where NATO enlargement and West‘s 
arguable non-compliance with international law have been named among threats to Russian 
national interests that need balancing and protection.
304
   
In an interview on March 2
nd
 2014 a former advisor of Russian president, Mr. Andrei 
Illarionov emphasised some crucial points for stopping Russian government to go further with 
its actions in Ukraine (that are directed to evoking civil war), among others he said that it is 
extremely important to establish Press Centre where journalists broadcast the events taking 
place in Ukraine in English (to let the world know what is going on) and in Russian because 
the very important allies of Ukrainians are Russian citizens ―who hate the regime that 
provokes brother-killing war, who do not and will not believe wrongful information.‖305 This 
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advice illustrates the above-described force of propaganda and lack of impartial information 
in Russian media. This is the point where the question of the right to truth strongly comes in.  
Are many Russian citizens approving their country‘s aggressive actions abroad because of the 
mysterious ‗Russian soul‘ that has imperial aspirations and need for strong state ‗codified‘ 
inside? As shown above, the reasons are more Earthly: the ‗Russian soul‘ is being vigorously 
chiselled in the face of Russian government‘s political purposes. This is how Russia, by 
creating a collective national identity and thereby all the individual identities, builds an 
‗internal legitimation‘ for its actions abroad, creating enemies and fighting them.  
If the EU Framework decision simply ‗leaps on leg‘ on legislative level but still admits the 
crimes in some official documents and publicly deplores all the crimes for the sake of Eastern 
and Central European member states, Russia does not need to compromise with anyone in its 
memory politics. The old and new enemies, ‗minimising‘ Russian effort in anti-Hitler 
coalition and ‗degrading‘ its win in Great Patriotic war, need to be fought, similarly to the 
ones in the ‗traitors‘ in ‗Fifth Column‘306 criticizing Russia‘s actions in Ukraine. This is the 
underlying attitude reflecting in Russian memory politics.  
3.2. Memory Laws and Politics of Russian Federation – Place for Re-Birth of 
National Pride 
In 2008 an ad hoc commission – ―Commission to Counteract the Falsification of History to 
the Detriment of Russian Interests‖ (Commission) – which used many different channels and 
also measures of ―markedly symbolic nature‖ (like reform of national symbols, recuperation 
of Soviet national anthem, bringing in new holidays to celebrate, art, museums) in its 
campaign
307
 – was established. The Commission is not active anymore but its work is carried 
on by different means. 
Alongside with the work of the Commission two draft-laws have been discussed in the Duma: 
―Countermeasures Against the Rehabilitation of National-Socialism, National-Socialist 
Perpetrators and Their Collaborators in the Newly Independent States on the Territory of the 
Former Soviet Union‖ and an amendment proposal of the Criminal Code which would 
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criminalise the denial of Nazi crimes
308
 and, in its initial version also (sic!) ―any attempt to 
designate as criminal the actions of the countries of the anti-Hitler alliance.‖309 The initial 
proposal for the criminal law amendment from the leading party United Russia was 
introduced in Duma in 2009 as a reaction to the moving of the ‗unknown Soviet soldier‘ to 
the military cemetery in Estonia in 2007.
310
  
The scope of the regulation of both drafts is clearly restricted with the acts committed in 
Germany in 1933-1945 as qualified at the Nuremberg tribunal. Without that restriction it 
would apply also for crimes of the SU. While the draft-laws concern very wide and undefined 
range of people (the term ―collaborators‖ could mean almost anyone), the responsibility for 
communist crimes has put on a narrow circle of people in power that time (decision of the 
Constitution Court of Russia from 30/11/1992).
311
 Both texts are more political than juridical, 
emphasising the status of Russia as a legal successor of the SU and re-glorifying the effort of 
the SU in united anti-Hitler coalition.
312
 The political nature of the drafts is also proved by the 
reading and adopting of the Criminal Code changes in fastened procedure to guarantee its 
coming into force by May 9
th, ―which should be symbolic.‖313 Thus in its adopted version it 
also prohibits ―desecration of the symbols of war honour.‖314 
Another field where Commission‘s legacy continues living is education. The Commission 
claimed that the history lessons and partly also history science lacked quality because there 
was no clear orientation in many of the new publications and the history falsification served 
political purposes and the purpose of deterioration of Russia in some ―pseudo-scientific‖ 
texts.
315
 The ―right‖ history education is claimed to be necessary. A member of the fraction of 
―United Russia‖, Zatulin argues that as there must be a warning on a pack of cigarettes about 
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the dangers of smoking, the state must warn about the dangers which books may contain.
316
 A 
historian, Galina Zvereva claimes that not historians but Kremlin political-technologists 
determine the conception of history textbooks in today‘s Russia.317 ―In this way,‖ she says ―a 
reproduction of mythological constancies, such as uniqueness of collective experience and 
national character (mentality) of Russians, nativeness, inherent heroism and spirituality of 
Russian nation, takes place.‖318 
3.3. History Education 
Putin sees education as an essential part of the national identity creation in Russia: ―The role 
of education is all the more important because in order to educate an individual, a patriot, we 
must restore the role of great Russian culture and literature. They must serve as the foundation 
for people‘s personal identity, the source of their uniqueness and their basis for understanding 
the national idea.‖319 
Part of historic narrative of the national idea is definitely the evilness of the Nazism and 
Fascism. The textbooks, both on world and Russian history contain headlines and phrases like 
‗threat of Fascism‘, ‗victory over Fascism‘ or ‗freeing the Europe from Fascism‘.320 Nazi 
regime and Fascism are described in darkest colours. For example, there is a videotaped 
lecture from the speaker of the lower house of the Duma Sergei Naryshkin, which is being 
showed in schools and which describes the long ago Western occupiers to the accompaniment 
of dark orchestral music and images of a dead village girl, blazing wood cabins and a 
cowering child.
321
 
The Communist atrocities on the other hand find no mentioning in the world history book. In 
the very new textbook ―Russian History of 20th-beginning of 21st Century‖322 they are 
mentioned but very shortly and in a rather laconic manner, more like ‗passing by‘ as one of 
the Russian history teachers told me. For example GULAG is mentioned in the 9
th
 grade 
textbook as system that was established in the interests of economy and work-discipline, 
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mentioning how cheap and effective the construction of Belamour canal was with the 
workforce of prisoners. Repressions, similarly to GULAG, are mentioned in the context of 
economic reforms, the so-called five-year plans, there is one sentence that laconically states 
that repressions were the government‘s reaction to low work discipline and productivity, 
hooliganism and drinking.  
In the context of collectivisation it is mentioned that Stalin decided to ―liquidate Kulaks as a 
class‖323 and that millions of people were deported to forced labour. But also that ‗Kulaks‘‘ 
land was needed as basis for new economy. The hunger of 1932-1933 is also mentioned and it 
is admitted that the state forbid to remind the hunger through mass-information channels, 
denied the problem and exported cereal while many millions of people died. Ukraine finds no 
separate mentioning in this context. There is a section in the book dedicated to mass 
repressions of Stalin
324
 that mentions the so-called five-grain-law which considered taking 
five grains of cereal a theft, a crime against state possessions, and allowed capital punishment 
for it; it focuses mainly on show-trials and immediately implemented death-punishments over 
political opponents and their families but says nothing about deportations in inhuman 
conditions or working in the deadly labour-camps. According to the author, 3,8 million people 
were repressed during 1930-50, in 1920‘s and 30‘s.  
Deportations from other countries, also Baltics, are mentioned in the context of national 
politics of the SU during the war. The statement that ―over 50 thousand Lithuanians, Latvians 
and Estonians‖ were deported to Siberia‖325 is preceded by a section about nationalist 
movements in Ukraine, Baltics, Crimea, Belarus, mountain areas of Chechen-Ingush regions 
which explains that ―[e]vents occurred where armed nationalist groups attacked either 
retreating or surrounded Red Army,‖326 and that Germans tried to take those movements 
under their control in order to weaken the Red Army. The book also discusses new wave of 
violence after the war, mentioning the special camps for those convicted in ―anti-Soviet 
activity‖ or ―counter-revolutionary acts‖ and violent deportations of previous war-prisoners of 
―freed territories‖ and ―hostile elements‖ from Baltic countries, Western Ukraine and Belarus. 
327
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In an overall context the book pretty much reflects the spirit presented in the conception 
underlying the construction of the course ―History of Russia 1900-1945‖ for 11th grade.328 
The conception, before going to the content part, states that the new approaches of Russian 
historians, deriving from the perspective of ―the protection and strengthening of the state 
sovereignty, growing a citizen-patriot of Russia‖329 form the methodological basis of the new 
textbook. As for the content part, the conception sets forth the importance of explaining the 
Bolshevist terror during civil war in its ―objective nature in current historical conditions,‖ that 
there was no organised hunger and the massive collectivisation was ―simply another 
alternative possibility for solving the problem of finding resources for the industrialisation 
that NEP was not capable of.‖330  
And although it was harsh on villages, another option for solving the problems ―simply did 
not exist.‖331 Concerning the massive terror of Stalin, it is concluded that ―Stalin acted in 
concrete-historical situation (as a commander) totally rationally – as a guardian of the system, 
as a consistent supporter of the transformation of the country into an industrial society 
managed from a united centre, as a leader of a country threatened by a war in the nearest 
future.‖332 As for the number of the victims, Danilov considers the most accurate to take into 
account only the ones executed and repressions during Great Patriotic War are regarded as 
necessary measures for ―preventing looting and alarmism, strengthening the labour discipline 
and performance‖333 (which is contrary to all historical evidence on death camps and other 
terror outcomes).  
Anyhow, it is considered much more important is to ask in the textbook, what was achieved in 
1930‘s. The central place in the textbook belongs to ―manliness and heroism of Soviet 
people‖ which differently from other warring countries ―held a massive nature.‖334 Thus, it is 
emphasised that ―the attempts to present the traitors of the Motherland as heroes‖ shall be 
discredited in the textbook. Concerning the meaning and price of the victory, ―the accent shall 
lay namely on the meaning and significance of the victory.‖335 
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3.4. Conclusion 
To sum up let us come back to the question about the right to truth in interaction with the 
right to informational-emotional self-determination and identity building. Memory and 
education politics in the modernisation process of Russia are carried by the collective identity 
building – the concept of unifying national idea. A prominent figure in Russian cinema sphere 
and supporter of Putin Nikita Mikhalkov has said that ―the making of films along the lines of 
the Hollywood model in terms of the creation of national heroes and defence of all important 
values [is] a question of ―national security.‖‖336 In the same line, the memory laws and state-
approved history writing in school books serve solely political aims. Using an expression 
from a master thesis on human rights culture in Russia, it can be concluded that history and 
memory have been successfully ‗securitised‘ in Russia.337  
In other words, the fields of law and education, meant to hold the truth and truthfulness as the 
highest criterion, do not fulfil their aim. The overall situation gives ground to conclude that 
Russia in its nation building activities has exited the legitimate area and is simply 
manipulating part of its past reality out of the world, violating thereby the rights of the 
victims, their heirs and general society to know the historical truth. As a Russian columnist 
Leonid A. Radzikhovski claims, ―the only possible adjective for the word ‗Russia‘ is Great 
Russia [velikaya]. No other adjective has a place […] officially it is prohibited, totally 
prohibited, to feel anything else but enthusiastic admiration.‖338 [emphasis added, M.R.] 
Conclusion 
This thesis, inspired by the on-going intense propaganda in Russian media that has succeeded 
to legitimise the aggression in Ukraine (and did the same in Georgia) and the fact that the neo-
imperialist attitudes are largely driven by the myth of Great Patriotic War and Russian role as 
one of the Great Powers in anti-Hitler coalition, attempted to seek answer to the question, how 
far can a state go in producing such myths and whether the ‗air-brushing‘ of certain 
unwelcome past legacy, is anyhow restricted from outside the political power-struggles. As 
the creation of historical narrative and building of national identity, aimed at providing a 
unifying basis for the people to feel part of their country, have a sense of patriotism, 
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necessarily leads to influencing the very private and personal sphere of individuals – personal 
identity and memory – the realm to look for such restriction could logically be human rights.  
Indeed, human rights law and international humanitarian law explicitly establish the right to 
know the truth about the fate of a person in case of enforced disappearances. The concept has 
developed further in the discipline of transitional justice and taken a rather concrete and 
comprehensive form, entitling individuals and collectives (the whole society) to know the 
truth about the genocide, crimes against humanity or comparable gross violations of human 
rights that have taken place in the society.  
The fact that transitional justice has limits and revealing the full truth in its whole depth and 
complexity takes time and often presumes distance, the jus cogens nature of the norms giving 
rise to the right to truth, its origin in acts that have no statute of limitation leads to the 
conclusion that the right to truth also applies beyond transitional period in peace-time 
societies. The wide practice of adopting memory laws, court practice implementing them, 
high level political debates on historical truth and the relationship between historic freedom, 
freedom of expression and state‘s duty to use legal memory for sustaining the social but also 
the ‗intrinsic value‘ of truth in the legal system leads to the conclusion that right to truth in 
peace-time functions as a general principle of international human rights law. The wide range 
of substantial values, like the need to protect the memory and dignity of the victims, their 
heirs, and whole humanity, the influence on the historical consciousness on the peaceful co-
existence of people in different societies and of states in international arena confirms this 
conclusion and shows the need for open and dispassionate dealing with the past. 
Examining various legal literature, international and national legislature and court practice, 
legal-philosophical and political writings, this thesis makes a distinction between two main 
types of truth: narrative and factual. The latter, understood as record of events, circumstances, 
evidence in the way they were, i.e. the factual reality of the past, falls under the protection of 
the right to truth. The narrative truth is protected under the right to truth as much as it must be 
in compliance with the forensic truth. 
It is important to note that the right to truth does not mean remembering at any cost, it does 
not mean making impossible the necessary forgetting. On the contrary, by setting limits to 
political manipulation of memory, it enables not only remembering but also forgetting. 
Coming back to the posed question in the introduction, what does a command ‗Remember!‘ 
mean, the author answered himself. His answer well reflects the legal content of the ‗duty to 
76 
 
remember‘ via the right to truth as defined in this thesis, encompassing substance, idea and 
practical importance of this right:  
―Remembering – starchy or not – may seem to be a suitable answer for denying. As hiding, optional 
presentation of information and forced forgetting was an inseparable part of daily functioning of the 
totalitarian regimes, the appeals to remember and save from the oblivion turned into resistance acts on 
their own. With over-reacting such resistance may become a real cult of memory, ceremonial holding 
on the past, that does not let it go. For the reconciliation of previously hostile national groups and 
melting them into one community, we sometimes have a duty to forget – to investigate, interrogate and 
read, to write down, to make the denial of what happened impossible, to mourn […] and finally … 
forget.‖339 
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Õigus tõele – ettearvamatu mineviku leebe tsiviliseerija 
Resümee 
Käesolev magistritöö on suunatud ühele osale rahvusliku identiteedi kujundamisest – 
ajaloolisele narratiivile. Sündmused tänases Ukrainas (ja mõned aastad tagasi Gruusias) said 
suuresti võimalikuks Venemaa eduka propaganda tulemusel, mis osana rahvusliku 
identiteediloome protsessist legitimeerib agressiivse välispoliitika kui osa Venemaa 
rahvuslikust huvist võitluses „natsismilembese― Ukraina valitsuse ning fašismi ja moraalsesse 
dekadentsi kalduva Lääne vastu. Teine Ilmasõda on keskseks osaks Venemaa rahvuslikus 
identiteedist, erinev arusaam toimunust, ohvritest ja kommunismikuritegudest on üheks 
olulisemaks takistuseks Eesti venekeelse elanikkonna integreerumisel.  
Nähes seost indiviiduaalse ja kollektiivse rahvusliku identiteedi ning ajaloolise narratiivi 
vahel, nende mõju riiklikule ja rahvusvahelisele julgeolekule, inimsusevastaste kuriteguse 
ohvrite ja nende järeltulijate ning kogu ühiskonna õigust ajaloolisele mälule, tekib 
põhjendatud ootus, et rahvusvaheline õigus peaks sisaldama piirangut ajalooliste faktide 
manipuleerimisele. Kuna kõnealune manipuleerimine puudutab sügavalt inimese väga 
isiklikku ala, tema identiteedi kujunemist, siis otsib antud magistritöö seda piirangut 
inimõiguste valdkonnast kui mõjusaimast riigi suveräänsust piiravast distsipliinist.  
Õigus tõele on leidnud expressis verbis väljendust ja käsitlemist rahvusvalise 
humanitaarõiguse ja üleminekuajaõiguse kontekstis, puudutades algselt kitsast valdkonda – 
teadmata kadunuks jäämise juhtumeid. Tänaseks on see õigus leidnud tunnustust tunduvalt 
laiemalt nii individuaalse kui ka kollektiivse õigusena saada tõest informatsiooni ühiskonnas 
aset leidnud inimsusevastaste kuritegude või võrreldavate suurte inimõiguste rikkumiste 
kohta. Õigust tõele peetakse tulenevaks jus cogens normidest ning nende normide 
rakendamise eelduseks. Rahuaja kontekstis väljendub see eelkõige nn kohustuses mäletada, 
mis täna realiseerub ajaloolist mälu puudutavas seadusandluses ja selle interaktsioonis sõna-, 
mõtte- ja väljendusvabadusega, olles vajalik nii ohvrite ja nende järeltulijate kui kogu 
ühiskonna inimväärikuse ja õiguste tagajana, suunatuna verise ajaloo kordumise vältimisele.  
Õigus tõele inimsusevastaste kuritegude kohta seab piirid ajaloolise narratiivi loomisele 
rahvusliku identiteediloome protsessis, keelates faktilise tõe, selgelt tõendatud ajalooliste 
faktide moonutamise või kollektiivsest mälust välja manipuleerimise ning tuues riigile 
kohustuse soodustada ja võimaldada avatud ning objektiivset mineviku käsitlemist 
ühiskonnas.  
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